Showing posts with label General History. Show all posts
Showing posts with label General History. Show all posts

Thursday, May 14, 2009

Looking for Popular Ideology in Ancient Rome

Mary Beard reviews T. P. Wiseman's Remembering the Roman People:
This book is ground-breaking for its simple suggestion that the ideology of Roman popular politics is not entirely lost to us, and for its virtuoso demonstration that, fragmentary, inadequate and intensively studied as our sources for the period are, they may still have more to tell us. Here as elsewhere, T. P. Wiseman offers us a view of late Republican Rome not preoccupied solely with elite self-interest, wealth and dignity – but where some voices still spoke out for equality, the sharing of wealth and land and for the rights of the common people.
Sounds like sort of a mix of PoMo LitCrit and Intellectual history. Interesting.

Wednesday, December 19, 2007

Review: Barbarism & Civilization

Barbarism & Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time by Bernard Wasserstein

Wasserstein is the Harriet and Ulrich Meyer Professor of History at the University of Chicago and has many works--both fiction and non--to his credit. He opens his survey of 20th century Europe with a quote from Walter Benjamin: "There is no document of civilization...that is not simultaneously a document of barbarism." Wasserstein continues:
During the past century Europe was the scene of some of the most savage episodes of collective violence in the recorded history of the human species. Yet the same period has also seen incontestable improvements in many aspects of the life of most inhabitants of the continent: human life has been extended, on average, by more than half; standards of living have increased dramatically; illiteracy has been all but eliminated; women, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals have advanced closer to equality of respect and opportunity.
Wasserstein has set himself the task of describing these improvements amidst a century of war and strife. His 20th century begins in 1914, on the eve of the Great War, and he sets the stage by explaining that there are two ways of looking at Europe in that year: backwards to a time of peace, prosperity and stability or "forwards and see the early tremors of social and international upheaval--the beginning of the end of the Eurocentric world." As he points out, the logic of the former approach is that "contemporaries could look back much more easily than they could see ahead." And what they saw was pretty positive, but under the veneer, trouble was brewing.

The veneer included the emergence of a middle-class, the bourgeoisie, as well as of the intellectual classes. Yet, this was also the time of the rise of the trade union. Together, forces converged and the raising of class consciousness led to “class conflict” and the emergence of various ideological movements such as Marxism and various socialist derivatives. But Europe's coming discord lay not in ideology--not yet.
The root of European disorder in 1914 was not…class, but ethnicity. Solidarities and antagonisms based on ethnicity, for reasons that lie buried in human hearts, answer to some of the most deeply rooted and instinctive social feelings of our species. European history in our time shows how futile it is to ignore them.
This is an argument that, for me, immediately called to mind Patrick Geary’s thesis in his Myth of Nations, but others have made the same observation. It is only one lesson learned (if not heeded) in the aftermath of the Great War. Another would be that conflict “inevitably increased the power of central governments, civil liberties, and diminished the ability of parliaments, courts, or public opinion to check the authority of governments and armed forces.” Still other lessons were better remembered and put to use in WWII such as the theory of “total war” involving both the military and the civilian population.

Wasserstein’s telling of the post WWI European revolutions is compelling and informative. (As a European history naïf, I was unaware that the U.S. had sent troops to help bolster the anti-Bolshevik forces). His explanation of how the Bolshevik’s won is a good example of his ability to synthesize and summarize a bit of military history for the layman:
In the Civil War the Bolsheviks had virtually the whole world and a largepart of the former Russian Empire ranged against them. Yet they won. The primary reason was the disunity of their enemies, who shared neither common aims nor a common strategy. Unlike their enemies, the Bolsheviks enjoyed the advantage of holding the centre and consequently of relatively secure internal lines of communication. They controlled the bulk of the population and of war industry.
In detailing the post-war peace process, Wasserstein returns to his cassus belli nationalism informed by ethnicity:
The diplomacy of the peacemakers, clothed in the garb of national self-determination and peaceful resolution of disputes, was sullied at several points by the crude imposition of national interests and by acquiescence in the use of force. The illusion was nevertheless created of a new order in which righteousness would reign supreme.
Thus was the League of Nations born and the world fooled itself into thinking there could be everlasting peace. Meanwhile, Nazism and Fascism rose. Fascism, writes Wasserstein, was:
...a primitive rationalization of gangsterism rather than a political philosophy in the conventional sense….Yet Fascism was vastly appealing to many. It promised to cut through the hypocrisy of the Giolittian spoils system, to restore order to society and the economy, to recreate the glory of the Roman Empire.
He has harsher words for Hitler’s Nazism
His movement was a revolt of the gutter, of losers who felt that, through no fault of their own, they had been thrown aside by respectable society and were determined to rise up and wreak their revenge. Apart from ill-defined dreams of racial domination, Hitler’s politics were inspired by no social vision. On the contrary, underlying his thought and actions was a barely hidden sociopathy: ‘What is stable’, he said, ‘is emotion, hatred.’ Hitler claimed to offer the German people a restoration of their national self-respect.
Wasserstein also compares Nazism with Communism and makes an interesting differentiation.
[Nazism] was an attempt to seize history by the collar and frog-march it in a direction determined primarily by the selfish interests and obsessive beliefs of those in power…[Communism‘s] claim, derived from Marx, [was] to be able to discern and to accelerate the underlying motive forces of history.
He also offers critical insight into the post-WWII mindset of those who survived. To wit, not only America has come to believe in a "greatest generation."
Each country, each national group, each political party fashioned its own version of the war and , as time went on, burnished remembrance and amnesia into self-serving myth. For some peoples, such as Serbs and Jews, a narrative of victimhood was a potion that came to serve as justification for resurgent nationalism. For the British, the lone struggle of 1940-1, the heroism of the few in the Battle of Britain and the many in the Blitz, reinvigorated national self-consciousness. For the French, the petty day-to-day accommodations that most had made with the occupier were overshadowed by the legend of resistance, that the Vichy regime had been made in France and supported, at least, initially, by the great majority of the French people.

For Germans the chief components of wartime memory were the agonies of the eastern front, the terror of Allied carpet-bombing of German cities, and the flight of civilian population from the path of the Russian army in East Prussia and elsewhere in the east…. From 1947 onwards the Cold War rendered the earlier struggle of the German army against Bolshevism somehow respectable. Military service on the eastern fron became a virtual badge of honour with all responsibility for the attendant atrocities against prisoners of war and civilians shunted onto the shoulders of the disbanded police state apparatus….For many Germans the terrible losses from Allied bombings of German cities somehow canceled out the crimes committed by the Nazis.
No country involved escaped the temptation to privilege “preferred memory” over history.

Wasserstein continues into the Cold War, which looms large in the second half of the century. But he also discusses post-WWII social and cultural changes spurred by both the memory of the conflict as well as the the re-drawing of national borders and the displacement of various peoples in its aftermath. He also explains why post-war Europe was fertile ground for the development of the welfare state.
Government spending everywhere had reached unprecedented levels during the war….High taxation, rationing, and government controls during the war had inured the possessing classes to a much greater degree of state control of the economy and society. Common sacrifice of soldiers and civilians of all classes had prepared minds for the application of egalitarian policies in the period of reconstruction. The warfare state…shaped the welfare state.
Wasserstein continues along, detailing the ebb and flow of the Cold War, de-colonization and the gradual movement towards European unity. (Of the last, an interesting counterpoint is the example of Belgium, which even now is experiencing tension based on the ethnically halved population of Flemish and Walloons.) The European youth uprisings of the '60s and the economic downturn of the 1970s culminated in the rise of neo-liberalism in Europe and the application of “Chicago school” economic theories here and there, particularly in Western Europe.

He continues until 2004, hitting all of the major touchstones. His final chapter offers a comparison between now and 1914.
Before 1914 undemocratic regimes interfered in the lives of the majority of ordinary people far less than the most liberal European governments of the new millennium. This was the paradox of the contemporary liberal state: it intruded in many unprecedented ways into the private sphere; yet liberty of the individual, measured by most reasonable criteria, had enormously increased in Europe by 2005 by comparison with 1914.

Two competing tendencies emerge from the dislocations of the pst century: on the one hand a growth of ruthlessness, manifested in wartime atrocities, criminality, and heightened racial hatreds; on the other, a growth of tenderness, exemplified in changed attitudes to the treatment of the mentally ill, the disabled, prisoners, children, and animals.
Barbarism and Civilization, indeed. But, pace Mark Steyn, demography is working against Europe and their ability to keep up the level of social welfare “civilization” to which they’ve become accustomed. The population is getting older and there are fewer young people (working fewer hours) to support them. And the short term solution of importing masses of immigrants, segregated from the rest of each particular nation’s mainstream culture, may have a higher cost in the long run. Ethnic-based nationalism is more dangerous when you are relying heavily upon a segregated “other” to maintain your way of life. Europe has to come up with a new way of dealing with this reality. But will it be a barbaric or a civilized method?

Wasserstein notes that throughout Europe, religion’s importance has drastically reduced. And he asks, “What could replace religion as a source of values?” Unfortunately, nothing has taken its place. And though “a variety of doctrines, mainly re-treads of old ideas” have been tried, “None, however, provided the scaffolding for an alternative social morality that could satisfy a majority in society.” Wasserstein’s final sentence gives us a depressing summary of the past century.
Evil stalked the earth in this era, moving men’s minds, ruling their actions, and begetting the lies, greed, deceit, and cruelty that are the stuff of the history of Europe in our time.
In that light, and keeping in mind the moral vacuum Wasserstein previously described, Europe seems ill-prepared to deal with the myriad problems it faces in a civilized manner. I hope he’s wrong.

All in all, B&C is a thick, weighty read with an important thesis. Wasserstein is a skilled synthesizer and a fluid writer and presents his topics in an engaging, if sometimes workmanlike, style. Barbarism and Civilization is a solid and insightful recounting of Europe's past century.

Thursday, November 15, 2007

Review: The Dead Guy Interviews

The Dead Guy Interviews: Conversations with 45 of the Most Accomplished, Notorious, and Deceased Personalities in History by Michael A. Stusser.

Michael A. Stusser is a Seattle-based journalist who authors the "Accidental Parent" column in ParentMap magazine and has written for an eclectic array of magazines, including mental_floss, Seattle Magazine, Yoga International Magazine, Law & Politics and Go World Travel Magazine. Stusser is also a game inventor with The Doonesbury Game (with Garry Trudeau), EARTHALERT, The Active Environmental Game, and Hear Me Out to his credit. And sometimes he blogs.

The premise of The Dead Guy Interviews (though there are some Gals included, too) is simple: what if you could sit down with a historical figure and ask him or her a few questions? Stusser has taken the concept and run with it. The result is a series of irreverant, contemporized and humorous 3-4 page "interviews" where no topic is off the table. However, betwixt and between the sometimes sophomoric humor, bits of profanity and sarcastic banter (and a lot of talk about the sexual picadilloes of various interviewees--Stusser leaves no stone unturned in this area), you may actually learn something.

A good part of the actual historical information about each individual is provided in the brief biographical sketches preceding each interview. For instance, in the introduction to his interview with George Washington Carver, we learn:
Though recruited by big shots such as friend Henry Ford, Carver kept it real, turning down an annual slary of over $100,000 to work for Thomas Edison and refusing to consult with Stalin on agricultural matters.
This passage is typical of the way Stusser educates while "keeping it real" via the use of modern day colloquialisms. Here's another:
MS:...Tell me, what was the Globe Theatre like?

William Shakespear: Lovely venue, almost like one of your so-called open-air stadiums today.

MS: Like a football stadium?

WS: If you must make fool-hearted analogies. We had seating in the round, and VIP boxes up high. Sadly, the acoustics sucked.

MS: Did you just say "sucked?"
Stusser also asks Charles Darwin about the Darwin Awards. The method works pretty well, especially for the teenager crowd. That's not to say that adults won't be entertained, though. Stusser does a good job of interspersing information in the midst of his tongue-in-cheek question and answer sessions. Aside from the introductory bios, Stusser's interviews often help flesh out the ideas and personalities of some of these historical characters. For instance, I learned something basic about Buddha's philosophy (of which I know almost nothing about) by reading this:
MS: As a prince you had it all. Your father, King Suddhodana, even arrange a marriage to a wonderful gal. But you left it all behind. Why?

B: At the age of twenty-nine I finally looked beyond the walls of the palace. There I saw four sights.

MS: An old crippled guy, a diseased dude, a decayed, nasty corpse, and an ascetic, right?

B: The truth of life: that death, disease, age, and pain are inescapable. Poor outnumber the wealthy, and the pleasures of the rich eventually come to nothing.
This is typical of Stusser's method and works to either give the reader all the information she wants or inspire deeper investigation.

Stusser also folds in criticism of the contemporary in these interviews. While interviewing Beethoven about his life as a struggling artist, Beethoven reveals what he would have done to make some money in today's music business, "The real money would have been in concessions--Beethoven T-shirts, crop-tops, posters. Oh, to do it all over again."

Stusser also uses these interviews as a vehicle to critique current politics (both as interviewer and subject). He is especially prone to slamming those of a particular ideological bent. A sampling:
Catherine the Great:"The nobles liked some of my policies. Land giveaways, granting them serfs, eliminating taxes.

Michael Stusser: Sounds like a Republican.

========

Confucious: Taking a moral high ground is difficult in an era of greed, ego, and instant gratification. Many should not lead, this is a certainty. Others should not attempt to.

MS: So, you're talkin' about guys like Rush Limbaugh and Don Rumsfeld, right?

========

MS: When you moved back to Catalonia after World War II, you were criticized for living in Spain while it was ruled by Franco.

Salvador Dali: And I could say the same thing about you and your president. Pick any one of your warmongering heads of state--and yet you live among them!

========

Thomas Jefferson: Women have a great purpose in life: marriage, children, and pleasing their husbands.

MS: You should have your own show on right-wing radio...
By no means is the book full of such instances--its more like a sprinkling--but there are enough instances to make it clear that Stusser is no fan of "the right." On the other hand, Stusser also isn't concerned with being considered politically correct:
MS: What was your view on black advancement?

George Washington Carver: Rising or falling, I believe, is practically inherent in an individual. Races and nations, too: They progress or are held back by the number of individuals who do the right thing. God works in the hearts of men, and the so-called Negro problem will be solved in His own good time, and in His own way.

MS: So African Americans had themselves to blame for not achieving higher status in the South?

GWC: Ya know, I try and avoid public statements on my philosophy and mainly stick to peanuts...

========

Ghengis Khan: Are you calling me a mongoloid?

MS: No. That's a derogatory term for retard. You're obviously not a retard.
Perhaps the humor--or irony--is going over my head, here. To be clear, Stusser often does use actual quotes from the individuals, so some of these may derive from that method. But it seems pretty close to the line.

A couple more things. First, stylistically, Stusser sometimes writes in dialect to give voice to many of his subjects (Einstein, Freud, Marx, Mussolini, to name a few)--for example, he will use "zees" for "this." This was distracting to me on the page, though it works better in audio versions of the book. Second, I noted a small editing error. One of Benjamin Franklin's pen names is given as Silence Dogwood (it was "Dogood").

Stusser is good at dispensing with the sort of urban legends and historical myths that have grown up around various figures. For example, he takes down nearly every common myth about George Washington (cherry trees, etc.) and explains that Nostradamus' prophecies were "Full of vague allegory and ambiguity, readers have interpreted them over the centuries for their own purposes and often see what they want to see."

Many of his chapters--those on Thomas Jefferson and George Washington come to mind--would probably serve as an interesting introduction to teenagers of a more nuanced historical picture of these figures. Others, however, are a bit more caricature or even a little "fluffy." (For instance, compare the rough treatment J. Edgar Hoover experienced to the non-judgemental, fluffy interview of Karl Marx--he does take it to Chairman Mao though!). But that's OK. Sometimes Stusser is like Mike Wallace, sometimes he's like Barbara Walters.

In the end, Stusser's The Dead Guy Interviews is entertaining and gets you to think. If you can get past some of the profanity and sex (and small amount of ideological stumping) then I'd recommend it as a good nightstand book or, with some qualifications, as a way to get your teenager more interested in history.

Tuesday, October 30, 2007

The Utility of Using Google to Find Medieval History in the News

I'm an "Americanist" but I have to admit that I have the most fun digging into the history of Late Antiquity/Early Middle Ages. About a year ago, I set up three key-word alerts via Googles news spider: "Dark Ages", "medieval" and "medievalist". I figured they'd give me a heads-up for interesting stories that may crop up from time to time. The results have been interesting, and maybe even illustrative.

By far, the most predictable results have been related to the "medievalist" search term. Pretty much every story is about some professor who will be giving a talk somewhere or who has written a book. "Medieval" has also been predictable, but for different reasons. While many of the stories (this is anecdotal, I didn't keep stats) were about various topics in medieval history, I could always count on a story or two about the "Medieval Warm Period" showing up. In the debate about global warming, the MWP has a large role to play. Nonetheless, using "medieval" (or a permutation) does provide good results.

And then there's "Dark ages." Rarely do stories containing this term actually have anything to do with medieval history. Mostly, it's used as a rhetorical pejorative against something or other that the author believes is backwards or barbaric. As such, it's essentially useless as a search term for finding new stories on medieval matters.

Thursday, September 20, 2007

I took the ISI History Quiz

I took the ISI History Test that so many college seniors at elite universities failed. Results:
You answered 57 out of 60 correctly — 95.00 %
Average score for this quiz during September: 75.3%
Average score since September 18, 2007: 75.3%
What did I get wrong?
Answers to Your Missed Questions:
Question #19 - C. philosopher kings.
Question #54 - D. can be reversed by government spending more than it taxes.
Question #58 - B. An increase in the volume of commercial bank loans.

Here are the questions and all possible answers (including my wrong ones) for the ones I missed:
19) In The Republic, Plato points to the desirability of:

That was a classic brain f**t on my part.


54) Keynesian economists conclude that the recession phase of a business cycle:
Eh. Economics ain't my strong suit...I suspect most historians can relate.

58)
What is a major effect of a purchase of bonds by the Federal Reserve?
....And again....

All in all, I was surprised I did so well, frankly. While some are arguing the test is unfair because it doesn't adequately deal with big concepts, a knowledge of basic historical facts is necessary to support the "big picture" takeaway that colleges aim to teach. Besides, many of the questions do deal with concepts. For instance:
31) Which author’s view of society is presented correctly?

39) The question of why democracy leads to well-ordered government in America when disorder prevails in Europe is central to:

There is a lot of reading that goes into answering these questions, no?

Or how about:
35) The Monroe Doctrine:

13) The struggle between President Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republicans was mainly over:

44) The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964) was significant because it:
Doesn't understanding the "Monroe Doctrine" or why Johnson and the Radical Republicans were fighting display more than just knowing facts and figures. Aren't these the sort of historical concepts that many say should be tested?

And then there's question about the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Heck, they even give the date to help you make an educated guess!

I can only surmise that the historians who take a negative view multiple choice tests--thinking "only" facts and dates can be tested--have probably not read the actual test. Maybe they should.

Friday, May 04, 2007

Review: English History Made Brief, Irreverent, and Pleasurable

English History made Brief, Irreverent, and Pleasurable by Lacey Baldwin Smith (Academy Chicago Publishers).

Smith is Professor Emeritus of History at Northwestern University and has written a number of books centering around the history of Great Britain. English History not being my bailiwick, I'd never read anything by him before. After reading his recent work, however, that will change.

Smith opens his book by noting that “history is not what happened in the past, but what today is worth remembering about the past.” Setting aside the historiographical discussion that such a comment can engender, he has written a fine work of history. Smith hits the high--and low--points of English History (note, it's "English" and not "British"-- Smith explains the difference) in a conversational and engaging way. It's as if you're your history professor's office hours were held at a kegger. In short, Smith injects a little humor and verve into his narrative, which is complemented by some very funny illustrations from Punch.

As a medievalist--and if historians are considered "dry," medievalists are downright parched--I found his take on the early medieval period in English history refreshing and funny. For instance, while describing how the Angles and Saxons came and conquered Celto-Roman Britain:
The invaders proceeded over the years to divide Britain among themselves. The Saxons in the area of London broke up into the east, south and west Saxons--Essex, Sussex and Wessex. The urge to box the compass generated the splendid, but also apocryphal, story of a north Saxon kingdom called Nosex which naturally died out very rapidly, but doubtless inspired one of Britain's longest running plays: No Sex Please, We're British.
Keeping with a theme, Smith also explains the English resurgence after the Plague by explaining that "somewhere around 1485, the English started having more and better sex...rising from two to four million by 1600." He also takes the opportunity to weave in a zinger or two when he can. For instance, this observation about Elizabethan society:
The family, over which the father was supreme, was seen as the Kingdom writ small. In learning obedience to and respect for their parents, Tudor children learned deference to authority on every level of society. Thus the inferior bowed to all forms of superiority, the freshman stepping aside for the senior, the bachelor of arts for the master of arts, the master of arts for the doctor of divinity or civil law, and all six for the professor, a way of life that high-ranking academics today regret has disappeared.
Indeed! But Smith's work isn't all wit and snark. He gives very concise and readable accounts of historical events and explains how one affected the other (eg; the reign of James I and the Glorious Revolution or the evolution of Parliament). Though there are chronological demarcations in the narrative, a narrative it is, not a patched together pop-encyclopedia of sequential--though disconnected--events. Smith does a fine job of moving the story of English history along in a coherent and entertaining way.

Smith concludes the book with an extended treatment of the British royalty--"The Royal Soap Opera." He covers the breadth of the more personal shenanigans of English royalty, plumbing the depths and climbing the peaks, and shows that royal peccadilloes are a constant. Commenting on the leveling of the contemporary Royal Family, he offers that "what is eating at the soul of Kingship is not moral outrage, but boredom." Like the rest of the entertainment industry, if the progeny of Elizabeth II don't give the press enough scandalous fodder, what is left?

Overall, I found that Smith's English History lived up to the rest of it's title, especially the Pleasurable part. Go out and get it--you'll learn something between chuckles.