Introduction to Historical Method: What is History?

[Nota Bene: What follows is Part 1 of a five-part series entitled Introduction to Historical Method. The Series Index is located here.]

Introduction: What is History?

History can be defined as the most complex, inclusive and many faceted of the social sciences. Quite a statement, but is it true? In fact, it is only a description; it assumes you know what social science is and, as such, is really not a proper definition at all. History is difficult to define because people, both present and past, have different preconceptions and viewpoints as to what exactly history is. Most definitions are at least partially true, but what does the term "History" mean? Generally, the following aspects of the term "History" are agreed upon:

1) Past Actuality - All things that have happened until this moment. Specifically, past human events that are irrevocably fixed in time and space. It is considered to be absolute and objective - it is what happened.

2) Record of Past Actuality - The human attempt to recapture the past, to fix it in words and to give it meaning. It is relative and subjective and is only a version of what happened from the viewpoint of the recorder. It used to be primarily considered a written record, but the 20th century saw a rediscovery of the value of oral history as well as technological advancement leading to visual mediums (other than art) such as movies and television as well as recordings. There are three types of record, Narrative, Didactic, and Genetic.

• The oldest and most commonly understood is the Narrative, a true story that is told. It was the only way to tell history starting around 4000 BC until about 500 BC. It is simply a telling of history in a chronological order, the order of time if you will.
• The next form, Didactic, evolved sometime around 500 BC (usually credited to Thucydides Peloppennesian War) and is essentially instructive history or history that teaches a lesson. The deocentric, or Christian, writers of the Middle Ages are the best example of this type. They treated Past Actuality as a precedent for action and hoped to bring guidance to those who read of the past, whether to glorify God, a social group or an individual. Didactic was the preeminent form until the Enlightenment when Leopold von Ranke, the father of modern history, published his first work and exorted his students to "go to the sources."
• Shortly thereafter, the third type, Genetic, emerged and is the primary type practiced from the 1800's up to the present. The goal of Genetic history is to establish the "why" of historical events by studying the complexity of cause and effect which in turn reveal the growth, development and evolution (sometimes called the basic phenomena) of history. A better way to put it is that Genetic history tries to establish the "why" for complex historical events by investigating causal relations.

3) Making the Record of Past Actuality - The process or technique -the method- used to make a record of past actuality is also considered 'History.' Method makes history a science, though not an exact one. There are 4 steps to historical method:

• An exhaustive search for sources of information.
• The study of the information in those sources.
• A critical evaluation of the information. An active process to comprehend motives and judge actions.
• The final synthesizing of material and recasting it according to personal judgement.

The basic considerations of method are the type of sources used and their reliability. The sources are the data and evidence on which an historical case is to be built and there are
different kinds of these.

1. Primary Sources - Are those in which people write or speak of themselves or contemporaries.

2. Secondary Sources - Those writings of a later day about earlier events.

3. Tertiary Sources - A compilation of secondary sources, though they often include some primary sources.

A Note - Some historians take this out to even further levels, such as centenary (an admitted exagerration), but generally the aforementioned are enough.

Regardless of the type of source, it must be reliable. Therefore, the Reliability of Sources must be determined. Sources can be Fraudulent, Inaccurate, or Biased ("FIB") and must be tested for:

1. Consistency - Ensure the evidence is logical and not contradictory?

2. Corroboration - Check sources against one another.

3. Freedom from Bias

If any of the "FIB"s are revealed, the source must be evaluated with that in mind.

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With these factors in mind, one can make another attempt to define history. Thus, History is the science which first investigates and then records, in their causal relation and developments, such past human activities as are definite in time and space, social in nature, and socially significant. To explain further, History is a science because it does have a definite method, as will be shown. It is further important to qualify which human events are considered historical. That the event be 'definite in time and space' is important because if such is the case, then the event can be philosophically proven to have occurred. That an event be social in nature is an affirmation of the humanity of history which is further qualified by the fact that it must be socially significant, which means it must contribute to the common knowledge of humanity.

As can be imagined, there are a wide array of definitions of history, most of which arise out of various schools of historical interpretation. Various schools of history arise out of particular academic training and the belief that one particular aspect of human nature or environment is paramount in interpreting history. Other 'schools' are not ignored, they just aren't as important. It helps to imagine a spoked wheel, like that of a Conastoga wagon, where each spoke represents a particular school of history and the hub of the wheel represents the primary school to which a particular practitioner of history adheres. A historian would be familiar with the spokes and would use them as support for his argument, but the central thesis would be derived from the hub.

There are many schools of history. Below are a few of the more common ones. To further help explain them, I will use the example of what each school might describe as the primary cause of the American Revolution.

1. Social - Investigates the development of human groups and communities and their interaction with larger society as they emerge. EX: They would focus on the type of colonist in America (independent, free-thinking) as the primary cause.

2. Cultural/Intellectual - Often considered different, but approach with same method, if from different direction. Both deal with the meaning of ideas and attitudes and their effect on social changes. Generally, Intellectual is considered a study of the elite--the idea makers, if you will--while Cultural deals more with the ideas and traditions of the common people. EX: Both might argue that the people listened to the great thinkers, such as Locke and Jefferson, who espoused philosophical ideas of liberty, etc.

3. Political - Focus on the operation and acts of governments, parties and institutions. EX: The British Parliament's idea of taxation without representation and the Intolerable Acts stoked the fires of Revolution.

4. Diplomatic - Focus on the relations between governments. EX: Strained relations between the Colonies and Great Britain led to the war.

5. Economic - Study developments in technology, production, consumption and division of wealth. EX: Money was the cause as the British attempted to interrupt commerce.

6. Psychohistory - Investigate emotional development of individuals and families using techiques derived from psychoanalysis. EX: King George III had poor relations with his father which affected his judgement.

7. Post-modern - There is no such thing as historical truth, thus, because knowledge is arbitrary, so is our conception of the past. EX: We will never really understand the causes of the Revolution, but each of us can interpret or reinterpret the event as we see fit.

*NOTE: Please remember, these are very generic definitions and simplistic examples and don't begin to cover the wide array of possibilities.
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Closely related to 'Schools' of History are 'Philosophies' of History. A philosophy of history explains the forces of history--what moves them and in what direction they are headed. It is an explanation not only of the most important causes of specific events but of the broadest developments in human affairs. There have been three schools of historical thought that are generally agreed upon.

1. Cyclical - (4000 BC - 100 AD): The timeworn 'History Repeats' school. Events periodically re-occur. Essential forces of human nature are unchangeable and so humans make the same decisions, or mistakes, over and over when confronted with similar or identical situations. A cycle of Birth/Life/Death was generally accepted and served as a template for this philosophy.

2. Providential - (100 AD - 18th Century): Primarily a result of the rise of Christianity which held that there was life after death and thus humans could have some form of immortality. This broke the Birth/Life/Death cycle and further believed that Divine Intervention could overthrow the past as the course of history was determined by God. History was an ebb and flow, a constant struggle between good and evil with the eventual victory of good forseen, as determined by God.

3. Progressive - (18th Century - about 1945): Brought about by the scientific and secular age of the Enlightenment. Universal laws of science were unlocked and the question was asked: What are the universal laws of human nature? Human history was a continual progress in which the situation of humanity was improving because of it's own efforts, not God's. Further, each generation built upon the knowledge of the previous. In 1918, after World War I, this idea was challenged and doubt was cast as to whether humanity was really progressing. The interwar years saw serious debates which exploded during and after World War II. Though Fascism and Nazism was defeated, Communism still loomed large as did the threat of nuclear war and the ultimate destruction of mankind. How could this be progress?

So where are we now? There is now no "definitive" philosophy, though many philosophies abound, and many historians question whether a defining philosophy is even possible or necessary.

Up Next: The Meanings of History

Vacation Time Again

Well, that was quick! After two weeks back at work, it's time for Summer Vacation, II. I'll be out for two weeks, but when I get back I'll be posting a series on Historical Theory and Method. See you then.

Harry Potter and History

In David Broder's recent column about Harry Potter, he Broder wrote about the need for better History standard's in education, noting that our middle- and high school students are losing their knowledge of history. He also mentioned a recent Senate hearing in which David McCullough testified. According to Broder, McCullough noted that of those who teach our students history, "Too many have degrees in education . . . and don't really know the subject they are teaching." As such

McCullough said that the problem starts with the training that teachers receive.

"It is impossible to love a subject you don't know," he said, "and without a passion for history, the teaching of history becomes a matter of rote learning and drudgery."

Without personal knowledge of history and enthusiasm for the subject, "you're much more dependent on the textbook," and, with rare exceptions -- he mentioned the great one-volume American history text by Daniel Boorstin, the late librarian of Congress -- "you read these texts and ask yourself, 'Are they assigned as punishment?' " McCullough, who is nothing if not passionate about the subject, added: "Amnesia of society is just as detrimental as amnesia for the individual. We are running a terrible risk. Our very freedom depends on education, and we are failing our children in not providing that education."

The schools, he said, are also denying them "a source of infinite pleasure," a pastime that can enrich them throughout their lives. "I think we human beings are naturally interested in history. All our stories begin, 'Once upon a time . . . .' To make history boring is a crime."

This is nothing new to historians, but it did spark a thought. What if some organization(s), such as the AHA or OAS, were to develop and disseminate a reading-list of "endorsed" historical fiction? Or, alternatively, what if a some sort of historical fiction primer was developed for every age group? Not being an educator myself, I don't know if such a thing already exists. Does anyone else? I believe that American Studies programs do this sort of thing by using American literature as part of the study of American culture, etc. But history is a bit different than "culture", though the spheres intersect to a great degree. Maybe I'm just looking for historically accurate alternatives to "Washington-chopped-down-the-cherry-tree", stories that can grab the attention of students and pique their interest. History is replete with such real stories, as McCullough has stated, but maybe an alternative or supplement would be the inclusion of some good historical fiction in the mix.

Harris: Atheists Should Analyze Each Religion, not Condemn Them All

Lee Harris recommends that atheists be less knee-jerk in their condemnation of all religious thought. Whether "superstition" or not, Harris remarks that

The atheist . . . would be forced to conclude that there was in fact nothing that distinguished societies more than the illusions that they entertain about the divine. The Aztecs worshipped cruel and ruthless gods who demanded mounds of freshly ripped out human hearts; the Zoroastrians worshipped a god of light who spent day and night watching over men, struggling against evil and working always for the good. Both forms of worship were based, from our point of view, on pure illusion -- and yet what a profound difference it makes to a society which illusion it chooses to go with.

Few things matter more than how men chose to deceive themselves.

I don't know for sure whether Harris is an atheist himself, and that doesn't matter, but I do know that much of what he writes is interesting and evocative. He is also a "child of the Enlightenment"--though he also undertook his own "un"-education--and much of his philosophy stems from this background, along with his own grasp of history and a sprinkling of psychology. In reading his work, one gets the impression that he believes that understanding ideology is important in analyzing contemporary society. As such, he has offered atheists a method to view religion as an ideology and advises that, from there, they should logically evaluate the degree to which each religion is good or bad. Perhaps he's pointing to a comparison of Christianity to Islam? In the past, he has written about the fantasy ideology of the Middle East, with radical Islam at its core. In some sense, his admonition to atheists can be employed by anyone. Whether you believe what they (the "other") believe is less important than acknowledging the sincerity of their belief.

Recasting the "War on Terror"

What to make of this?

"The Bush administration is retooling its slogan for the fight against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, pushing the idea that the long-term struggle is as much an ideological battle as a military mission, according to senior administration and military officials. . .

Administration and Pentagon officials say the revamped campaign has grown out of meetings of President George W. Bush's senior national security advisers that began in January, and it reflects the evolution in Bush's own thinking nearly four years after the Sept. 11 attacks. . .

"It is more than just a military war on terror," Steven Hadley, the national security adviser, said in a telephone interview. "It's broader than that. It's a global struggle against extremism. We need to dispute both the gloomy vision and offer a positive alternative."

Philosophical Roots of Al-Qaeda's Ideology

Just catching up, but this post, citing Andrew Wheatcroft’s Infidels: A History of the Conflict Between Christendom and Islam, traces the roots of Al-Qaeda's ideology to the 19th century and concludes:

The political philosophy behind al Qaeda’s movement has been developing for more than a century. Indeed, to a non-expert outside observer, it looks as though al Qaeda’s articulated radicalism is the only political philosophy that seriously competes for legitimacy in much of the Muslim world. Communism – which once contended for legitimacy in many Muslim countries -- is dead, and “moderate Islam” does not seem to excite sufficient passion to motivate most Muslims to risk their lives to turn in the radicals in their midst. Western concepts of “popular sovereignty,” which are worth fighting for, are not well-known and are only being articulated at all in a few corners of the Muslim world. Indeed, most Muslim governments are based not on any defendable political philosophy, but on rank authoritarianism or the divine right of kings. In the absence of competition, a coherent and superficially spiritual political philosophy can gain a lot of traction, almost no matter how horrible its consequences. That political philosophy in turn will inspire groups that are only loosely affiliated with the founding political movement. This is why al Qaeda, which means "the base," and its affiliates have been able to sustain wars in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, the Balkans, Spain, England and the United States, and used many other countries (Germany and the Netherlands, for example) as staging areas. Al Qaeda will not go away if America withdraws from Iraq, and it would not go away if Israel withdrew from the occupied territories. It can, in the end, only be beaten by Muslims who are willing to take a stand and risk their lives in defense of an inspiring alternative political philosophy.

Can the West help moderate Islam (such as by spreading democracy) or will none of it matter unless an Islamic Luther comes to the fore?

Back

I took a week off from work and fully intended to blog during that time. Well, I didn't. A few things, both planned and unplanned, popped up, punctuated by my Hemingwayesque Thursday during which I went Striped Bass and Fluke fishing off the coast of Rhode Island and Block Island, drank beer, went to Medieval Latin class (took a quiz) and then attended the tail end of a low-key bachelor party at the local Hooters. (The last was truly a tame affair: I'm sure Ernest would have gone in for a bit more ;) Anyway, I'm back (but I'll warn you ahead of time that in two weeks I'll be gone again) and regular blogging will resume.

The Ahistoric Roots of Radical Islam and a Call for Muslim Accountability

Ziauddin Sardar writes in the New Statesman about the need for the majority of Muslims to rid their religion of those who espouse terrorism in the name of Islam.

It is true that the vast majority of Muslims abhor violence and terrorism, and that the Koran and various schools of Islamic law forbid the killing of innocent civilians. It is true, as the vast majority of Muslims believe, that the main message of Islam is peace. Nevertheless, it is false to assume that the Koran or Islamic law cannot be used to justify barbaric acts. The terrorists are a product of a specific mindset that has deep roots in Islamic history. They are nourished by an Islamic tradition that is intrinsically inhuman and violent in its rhetoric, thought and practice. They are provided solace and spiritual comfort by scholars, who use the Koran and Islamic law to justify their actions and fan the hatred.

To root this ideology, you first must understand from where it comes and he outlines three central characteristics of the "tradition that nourishes the mentality of the extremists." First is it's ahistoricity:

It abhors history and drains it of all humanity and human content. Islam, as a religion interpreted in the lives and thoughts of people called Muslims, is not something that unfolded in history with all its human strengths and weaknesses, but is a utopia that exists outside time. Hence it has no notion of progress, moral development or human evolution.

He bolsters his point with an example the seemingly programmatic destruction of religious and historic buildings in Mecca by Saudia Arabian Wahabbists. Why would any religious sect seek to destroy it's history?

Because other Muslims will relate to the history of the Prophet, and they will then see him as a man living in a particular time and space that placed particular demands on him and forced him to act in particular ways. The Wahhabis want to universalise and eternalise every act of the Prophet. For them, the context is not only irrelevant but dangerous. It has to be expunged.

What this means is that the time of the Prophet has to be constantly recreated, both in thought and action. It is perfect time, frozen and eternalised. Because it is perfect, it cannot be im-proved: it is the epitome of morality, incapable of growth.

The second characteristic is that the ideology is monolithic. There is no room for change, argument or reform. "It does not recognise, understand or appreciate a contrary view. Those who express an alternative opinion are seen as apostates, collaborators or worse."

So no complaint or opposition is allowed. A perfect tradition can only produce perfect fatwas. And those who are seen as betraying Islam can themselves become subjects of other perfect fatwas. As a tradition outside history, it does not recognise the diversity of Islam. The humanist or rationalist tradition of Islam, or the great mystical tradition, thus appear as a dangerous deviations. In Bangladesh the Wahhabis and Deobandis are terrorising and burning the mosques of the Ahmadiyya sect, which does not see the Prophet Muhammad as the last Prophet, and insist that Ahmadis should be declared "non-Muslims". In Pakistan the Sunnis are killing Shias because they do not see them as legitimate Muslims. Ditto in Iraq. In Algeria the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) openly declared that the entire "Algerian nation" was deviant and should be killed. As for Saudi Arabia, you cannot even take a commentary or translation of the Koran into the country that does not follow the prescribed line.

The third characteristic is the self-righteousness of those who prescribe to the ideology. Terrorist acts are justified by selectively quoting from the Koran. Sardar refutes the arguments of those who say that this is a rather modern development and supports his contention with a brief summary of the history of the Kharjites

... a puritan sect which believed that history had come to an end after the revelation made to the Last Prophet. From now on, there could not be any debate or compromise on any question: "The decision is God's alone." They were prone to extremist proclamations, denouncing Ali as well as Othman, the third caliph, and pronouncing everyone who did not agree with their point of view as infidel and outside the law.

Sardar calls modern terrorists "neo-Kharjites" and explains further that

Like their predecessors, the neo-Kharjites have no doubt that their identity is shaped by the best religion with the finest arrangements and precepts for all aspects of human existence; and there can be no deviation from the path. Those who do not agree are at best lesser Muslims and at worst legitimate targets for violence. In their rhetoric all is sacred, nothing secular and retribution is the paramount duty. "Since they have left humanity and history out of the equation," says Dr Najah Kadhim, director of Islam21, a global network of Muslim intellectuals, "they have no conscience. No notion of guilt or remorse. Since the idea that they are perfect is part of their psychological make-up, they can do anything with impunity." Injustice and violence are inbuilt in their thought and tradition, which, under certain circumstances, is transformed into undiluted fascism. We saw this most clearly in the case of the Taliban.

In the end, Sardar urges his fellow Muslims to accept that the terrorists "are products of Islamic history." Muslims must realize that they face an internal threat much more dangerous than any perceived external threat. In fact, Sardar believes "it is a struggle for the very soul of Islam." Additionally, Sardar believes that for Muslims

The war on terror, in fact, cannot be a war at all. It has to be a reasoned engagement with the politics of tradition. If Islam has been construed as the problem, then Islam is also the essential ingredient in the solution. . .

If Muslims do not take on the challenge, they cede the initiative to those who have misconceived the problem and accepted a military strategy that is no solution. And that will make us all prey to more violence.

I applaud Sardar's call to his co-religionists, but in the meantime, it would be irresponsible for the leaders of those nations who are bearing the brunt of terrorism to sit back and wait for the average Muslims to heed his call. This is not an either or situation. Rather, Muslims and non-Muslims should work together against our common enemy by utilizing the means we have at our disposal. So-called "moderate" Muslims are in the best position to take their religion back from within. In the meantime, the West has every right to defend itself against terrorism. If we could do it without war, we would.

Perhaps Sardar's plan of action will be heeded and, perhaps, as terrorism declines the military reaction to it will also decline. That is something reasonable people all desire. Unfortunately, not enough moderate Muslims have been willing to do much more than condemn the attacks. They have been reluctant to cooperate with the various national governments, perhaps fearing retribution. Maybe, as a recent poll may indicate (though the results appear mixed to me), their attitudes are changing. By actively identifying and cooperating with the authorities, Western Muslims could more rapidly effect the change called for by Sardar. Muslims and non-Muslims want the same thing, albeit for different reasons: an end to terror in the name of Islam.

History Carnival XII

Caleb McDaniel has posted History Carnival XII, and another fine installment it is. Somehow, I managed to get an early mention. I guess there's something to piggybacking on the backs of the big boys! Here are some I found interesting:

Jason Kuznicki at Positive Liberty has posted a very good Introduction to a "theoretical" course on the Western Intellectual Tradition. He promises a syllabus soon!

Nathanael at The Rhine River writes about the bourgeoisie "municipal revolutions" in France taat were more conservative than the French Revolution they helped spawn. "They attempted to amend their constitutions; in the minds of the bourgeoisies, revolution had clear goals and clear endpoints. "

Mark Grimsley at Blog Them Out of the Stone Age argues that the American Civil War was a "people's war." A lot of installments, and I've only read the first, but it looks interesting.

Siris takes a look at Alexander Hamilton, to my mind, the most under-appreciated Founding Father. (If that's possible...I guess it's relative, huh?)

The Little Professor examines some of the history in historical fiction, particularly historical romances (he's using works about Anna Boleyn), and warns against the various perils.

Caleb also pointed to this new aggregator called Damasus. According to its author, it "scans academic journals and reports on the latest publications. It’s up as ‘proof of concept’ and so may not be around for long. It depends on how much it gets used." Let's use it!

Iraq: Terrorist Flypaper or Terrorism's "Cassus beli"?

I've thought that there was some credence to be given to the flypaper theory--fight the terrorists there so we won't have to fight them here--as applied to Iraq. With the recent London bombings as background, Gregory Scoblete convincingly argues that Iraq-as-flypaper is a flawed theory.

The strategy of aggressively preempting terrorists and terror-threats, the essence of the administration's counter-terrorism policy, is fundamentally sound. The problem begins when the pitched battle between Jihadists and U.S. forces in Iraq is framed as an either/or equation -- either we fight terrorists in Iraq or we fight them here -- because the reality, as London, Madrid, Turkey and the entire tragic litany demonstrates, is that we're fighting them everywhere. That Iraq has attracted the flies is both true and largely irrelevant; the flies continue to murderously alight elsewhere, despite our presence in Iraq. . .

The idea that Iraq is an irresistible magnet for jihad, diverting the radicals' attention from U.S. domestic targets, assumes that there is a hard-and-fast number of holy warriors and that once they enter the killing fields of Iraq in sufficient numbers our troubles will be over. It also ignores the still open question of whether the conflict is motivating Muslims who would otherwise have demurred from martyrdom to join the fight and thus constitute a seemingly limitless suicide assembly line. [emphasis in original]

I concur. It really isn't an either/or choice, as London and Madrid have reminded us. Thus, Scoblete is accurate when he further explains that Al-Qaeda is too decentralized and "that the 'central battlefield' on the war on terror is wherever a suitably fanatical Muslim is prepared to blow him/herself up. That U.S. forces are decamped enticingly in Iraq does not mean that terrorists will forsake Western targets." Iraq is the biggest front, but not the only front.

Yet, this leads me to a criticism of Scoblete's belief that there is still an "open question" regarding the War in Iraq as the centerpiece of jihadist motivation. He should know better. It is more than mere mantra to say such things as "9/11 happened before Iraq." And as the blogger Callimachus reminds us:

But wait, weren't we told not too long ago it was all about Israel? And that they were all on fire over the defiling presence of U.S. military boots way on the other side of the Land of the Two Holy Mosques?

Face it: there's a simmering stew of resentment among a vast pool of Muslims over a broad swath of the earth. Many sticks can stir the pot. If a more potent one comes along, the stirrers will use it till they find an even better.

In essence, while Scoblete is correct that Al-Qaeda is too decentralized for us to think that all of their jihadist eggs will be broken in the Iraq basket, he shouldn't buy into the belief that Iraq is a unique, or even the primary source of jihadist fertilizer. In fact, why Iraq and not Afghanistan?

The answer is because, unlike the War in Afghanistan, the War in Iraq has caused a rift in the West which Al-Qaeda has sought to exploit. In this, they have succeeded. They have picked up on the Western rhetoric espousing the illigitimacy of the "War for oil" and used it to add a kind of warped legitimacy to their terrorism. As such, their own rhetoric is both derivative of, and buttressed by, that of Western critics of the War in Iraq. (This does not mean that Western critics are conscious, or even unconscious or subconscious, supporters of terrorism. Nonetheless, like it or not, their words are being used by those who commit terrorism). In a society already predisposed to have a strong dislike for the Western "other," stories that support these predispositions, especially when accompanied by the "confessions" of those from the West, are extremely attractive. The result is a strengthening of both the appeal and apparent legitimacy of the ideology of radical Islam, particularly Al-Qaeda's strain, among those ready to receive it.

Scoblete touches upon the inherent strength of organizational decentralization, but he doesn't really say why it is effective. The reason decentralization is so effective for Al-Qaeda is because the organization of Al-Qaeda has succeeded in installing the ideology of Al-Qaeda as preeminent throughout radical Islam. In essence, the ideology has superseded the organization itself. As such, while Iraq has been used effectively as a recruiting tool and rhetorical touchstone, there were, and will be other, perceived "insults" to Islam that will be used as legitimization for jihad. There is still Israel, after all. It is correct to say that Iraq is not the only front in the War on Terror. It also isn't the only reason for it.

UPDATE: Greg Scoblete has responded and believes that I misinterpreted his postion on Iraq.

I manifestly don't buy the argument that Iraq is "causing more terrorism" in the broad sense of Islamic terrorism - bin Laden's group, and those flying planes into buildings, are motivated by a fundamentalist religious zeal and not a political grievance. They can't be appeased. Nor should they.

That doesn't change the basic though murky question: are Muslims entering Iraq and committing acts of terrorism who would have otherwise not embraced terrorism? If that question is answered affirmatively, our job is immeasurably harder. If the answer is no, then our prospects improve.

My apologies to Greg for the misunderstanding. So, we agree that Iraq isn't a conspicuous root cause for terrorism.

Greg's main concern is whether our job in Iraq is made tougher because more terror-minded individuals are able to enter the fray there. As Greg mentions, the geographical convenience of Iraq facilitates greater "participation" in jihad. Perhaps, then, the answer is this: the number of potential terrorists has not increased, but the number of both potential terrorists able to actively participate in jihad (facilitated by their proximity of Iraq) as well as the rate at which these potential terrorists have actually decided to take action (and die) has increased. The easier something is to do, the more likely it is that more people will do it.

Iraq is not a conspicuous motivator for more terror, it is just another piece of the ideological template. Thus, I don't think that more people are being "converted" to terrorism because of Iraq. But the practical affect of a larger battlefield that is closer to the terrorist nexus has been an increase in the rate at which passive consumers of terrorist ideology are able to become proactive jihadists. But remember, the location of the terrorists is more important than their number: 100 terrorists in Fallujah facing down a battalion of Soldiers or Marines is less of a threat than 100 terrorists dispersed throughout the U.S. ready to self-detonate.

"America's Unfinished Revolution": A Symposium ...

The Cliopatria blog is hosting another symposium. This time it's on Gary Nash's essay (partial excerpt) entitled "America's Unfinished Revolution." Go to the symposium for reaction by some of the big boys before reading my two cents.

I've done some research into the historiography of how Bernard Bailyn's "paradigmic" Ideological Origins of the American Revolution has been interpreted, reinterpreted, over-interpreted, misinterpreted and criticized. Included in this is the contemporary critique made by Nash on a 1973 essay written by Bailyn. Bailyn had contributed the lead essay in a compilation of papers [Essays on the American Revolution, ed., Kurtz and Hudson] that had been read at a symposium on the American Revolution held at Williamsburg in 1971. Entitled “The Central Themes of the American Revolution: An Interpretation,” it was a summary of Bailyn’s understanding of the core factors of the American Revolution, based mostly on his previous work. He also addressed the difficulty of explaining the roles of loyalists and slaveholders within his interpretative framework and recounted the years after independence, in which he emphasized both the optimism of Americans and their distrust of power and those of privilege who tended to wield it.

In his review [Nash, The William and Mary Quarterly 31, no.2 (1974), 311-314], Nash contended that the fundamental flaw in Bailyn’s overall interpretation of the Revolution was his insistence on according minimal credit to socioeconomic forces as important causative factors of the Revolution. This particular criticism was nothihng new. In fact, others, such as Gordon Wood, had implied as much nearly a decade earlier. [Wood, The William and Mary Quarterly 23, no.1 (1966): 3-32.] Nash's criticism was much more strident in tone. He argued that the relationship between various social groups and the particular ideologies that they embraced was inseparable. Nash also charged that Bailyn seemed too cavalier in his treatment of the slavery issue. He took particular umbrage with Bailyn for saying that the failure to abolish slavery was “an admirable ‘refusal,’” which kept the Revolutionary movement from sliding off into the “’fanaticism’” of abolition. Finally, Nash criticized the entire compilation of essays, and took the editors of the work to task for not including any essays that addressed the issues of either African-American or Native American viewpoints during the Revolutionary era.

Bailyn responded to Nash’s critique first by stating his original goals in writing his essay and then by addressing Nash’s particular charges. Bailyn reiterated his statement in the essay that his explanation “does not drain the Revolution of its internal social struggles” nor any of the other favorite themes of social or radical historians. What it did do, Bailyn wrote, was describe “why at a particular time the colonists rebelled and establishes the point of departure for the constructive efforts that followed.” As to the slavery issue, Bailyn stated that he was only attempting to explain the reasons why the revolutionaries failed to abolish slavery, not to excuse them. Bailyn’s explanation for why the revolutionaries didn’t address the issue was that “they generally saw the incompatibility of slavery with the free states they hoped to create, condemned the institution, and did eliminate it in the northeast and northwest.” According to Bailyn, the contemporary reasons given were fear of societal tensions with many newly released slaves and, more importantly, a desire to not sunder the nation over the slavery issue, “which a fanatical pursuit of abolition at that point would almost certainly have done.” He again referred to his own essay, quoting "A successful and liberty-loving republic might someday destroy the slavery that it had been obliged to tolerate at the start; a weak and fragmented nation would never be able to do so.” Nash replied by criticizing Bailyn’s “Anglocentric history with a passion” and inability to be properly critical of the founders’ attitude toward slavery.

With this over 30-year old debate as perspective, we can see that, according to Nash in his latest essay, nothing has changed. But as the respondents of the symposium at Cliopatria have shown, that's not quite true. As such, could it be that Nash merely wants to continue a battle already won because that's the only arena he knows? Is this what happens when "history with a purpose" achieves its essential goals? Apparently the answer is yes. Instead of looking for a new method or focus, the contemporary moral historian must continue to write as if nothing has changed since he took up the "good fight." Thus, his perspective becomes akin to that of Quixote as he regarded the windmills.

Does Field Specialism Occur too Early?

The PhD (Dphil) in English has much to be said for it. It's good training in scholarly method. It instructs the student how to handle large projects. Occasionally (too occasionally) it adds to the store of human knowledge. The downside is that it pre-specialises the mind. It encourages a scholar, in their early twenties, to draw the boundaries too tight. This, in turn, leads to the greatest bane of current academic life: field specialism.

"Can you teach Wordsworth this semester?" you ask. "No," is the reply, "I'm a Keatsian. Try Snodgrass. He did his PhD on the Prelude".

John Sutherland was writing about English professors, but I think his thoughts could be broadly applied to the historical profession. In history, I don't think that field specialism per se is bad, only that so many specialize in a field so early. The traditional PhD track encourages people to travel from undergrad->PhD without ever leaving the Ivy covered walls for, on average (I guess), 8-10 years of professional development.

Every field, be it engineering or history, encourages specialization, but the academic environment offers an opportunity to conduct deeper, more thorough and more general investigation into the broader field of history than do the professions that require entrance into the "real world" of capitalist society. However, the reality is that the traditional PhD track encourages a rapid narrowing of focus from the general, to the specialty to the near-microscopic examination of a particular area. The result is often akin to studying a blade of grass in one small patch of one corner of a vast field. One acquires a deep and thorough knowledge of the particular blade of grass and the soil from which it grows. As a matter of course, knowledge of the wider patch in which the blade of grass is located is also pretty thorough, but as the area expands--from the patch, to the corner to the field--knowledge becomes shallower. Would it be better to require that young historians be more general in scholarship? That instead of embarking on a deep-sea voyage for the "Golden Monograph" right off, they should test the coastal waters in dugout? Would a young historian be better served by being encouraged to research and write for publication shorter pieces-- at first, more general pieces to be followed by topically narrower pieces--as a way to practice before taking the monographic plunge?

As a non-traditional grad student, I realize that I don't have all of the insight necessary to answer these questions. I also realize that my particular situation--an older grad student with a non-history undergrad background--may bias me against the traditional uninterrupted PhD track that culminates in a dissertation, which hopefully gets published. With all that being said, how uninformed am I? Does specialization occur too soon?

Blogging the Battle of Gettysburg

What if blogs existed in 1863? What would it look like if someone "live-blogged" the Battle of Gettysburg? Something like this?

Bloody, bloody, day.

How we survived it, I don’t know. I can tell you that it was no thanks to our “generalship.” I put that in quotation marks because I don’t think there’s ever been a more wretched group of incompetent officers in the history of warfare. Oh there are exceptions like General Reynolds (God Rest his soul), General Hancock and a few others. But by and large, the only reason our army still lives is because of the individual bravery of the union soldier.

My beloved Iron Brigade is a perfect example. Cut off from the rest of I Corps on the extreme left of the fight, most of our boys running for their lives, those boys in the slouched black hats stood firm! They had rebs on three sides of them but they stopped the advance of Lee’s men long enough to give ther rest of their comrades from I Corps the chance to get away and fight tomorrow.

It cost my Black Hatters dear; they lost 1100 out of 1800 engaged.

I’m getting similar figures from other commands. Some regiments in XI Corps have simply ceased to exist with 90% or more in killed, wounded, missing. It looks like we lost about 30% from both Corps but the stragglers are still coming in.

The retreat through town was a mess and with no real leadership our boys had to pretty much figure out for themselves where the army was making a stand.

A very cool idea. [via Glenn at What Attitude Problem]

History Carnival XI

If you tire of burgers and dogs, sun and fun, why not take a peek at History Carnival XI over at Siris. It's a dandy with nice graphics, too, I might add. Yes, the bar continues to get raised.

Brian Williams: "Several U.S. presidents were. . . probably considered terrorists of their time by the Crown in England"

Brian Williams is the latest to engage in a shallow historical analogy and expose himself to criticism. Prior to last night's NBC News telecast, Williams wrote:

Many Americans woke up to a curious story this morning: several of the former Iran Hostages have decided there is a strong resemblance between Iran's new president and one of their captors more than 25 years ago. The White House and most official branches of government are ducking any substantive comment on this story, and photo analysis is going on at this and other news organizations. It is a story that will be at or near the top of our broadcast and certainly made for a robust debate in our afternoon editorial meeting, when several of us raised the point (I'll leave it to others to decide germaneness) that several U.S. presidents were at minimum revolutionaries, and probably were considered terrorists of their time by the Crown in England.

He followed this up in his nightly newscast when, referring to the report on the story by Andrea Mitchell, Williams asked,

"What would it all matter if proven true? Someone brought up today the first several U.S. presidents were certainly revolutionaries and might have been called 'terrorists' by the British crown, after all."[source]

GOP Vixen has one of many responses:

I'd like to add to the pile of facts being assembled by reminding Williams that John Adams, no doubt one of the "terrorists" Williams was talking about, successfully defended, in the face of fierce public opinion, British soldiers accused of firing into a crowd in what came to be known as The Boston Massacre.

Another remarked that

During the Revolutionary War, the British burned homes of settlers, executed ‘traitors’ and ransacked the nation. We gave the British soldiers quarter for the most part and eventually shipped a large number of Red Coats back to England . . . alive. Never did American soldiers storm into buildings and take everyone inside hostage.

While these and others are properly critical of Williams' facile analogy, he also should be critized for anachronistically applying the terminology of "terrorism" to actions in the Revolutionary Era. As such, I would add that the Loyalists in the American Colonies weren't treated well by their Revolutionary neighbors, however to call their actions "terrorism" is simply not correct. (Also, I'd advise that no one calls on the church-burning scene in The Patriot as proof for British atrocities!) Finally, I realize this incident is being seized upon by some of the usual suspects, but that shouldn't stop historians of all political stripes from being critical of Williams.

UPDATE: Callimachus at Done With Mirrors has posted his own worthwhile thoughts, including a bit on what the British thought of the American Revolutionaries and a link to the etymological origins of "terrorism."

Immigrants and War: French Canadians in the Civil War Era IV

NB: This is the 4th and final part of a series (Here is Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3). In short, if you don't feel like reading the other three, I guess you could be satisfied reading this post. As far as the entire 4-part series goes, it is a conflation of a traditional research paper with online links interspersed. Time prevents me from a thorough going-over, so any mistakes, misattributions or faulty citation (in short, "sloppiness") should be taken with a grain of salt. While I'm aware of some formatting inconsistencies, I ask that the reader pass over those: I'm more concerned with the content than the presentation. Nonetheless, it would be appreciated if legitimate scholarly errors or oversights were brought to my immediate attention.


PART 1  -  PART 2  -  PART 3  -  PART  4 

 

Summary

Prior to the Civil War, French Canadians had recognized that work at a relatively generous wage could be found in the United States. Some took advantage of this either temporarily or by choosing to settle in America. New England was particularly attractive to the poor French Canadian immigrants due its close geographic proximity, which made it a shorter and cheaper journey. At first, those who immigrated tended to settle in the states of northern New England and worked on farms, in the timber industry or in the brickworks. Just prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, the modern textile industry had begun to develop, particularly in Southern New England, and some French Canadians had begun settling in these industrial centers.

The outbreak of the Civil War caused a crash in the cotton dependent textile industry and many French Canadians returned to Canada. Some stayed in American and found jobs in other industry or returned to their old jobs when the cotton mills retooled and began processing woolens. Others enlisted in the Union Army, though the exact numbers are unknown. Some French Canadians living in Canada also enlisted, while others were impressed by trickery. Regardless of the actual amount of French Canadians who enlisted, the fact that they shared in the same hardships as their fellow soldiers is indisputable.

By 1863, the war needs of the Union Army had caused a manpower shortage and agents were dispatched to Canada to recruit French Canadians to work in the mills. This started a slow migration back to New England, which hastened at war’s end. “Petit Canadas”, no more than the French Canadian version of the ghetto, began popping up in the mill towns. French Canadians endured prejudice and jealousy from both Americans and other immigrant groups because of their reluctance to fully embrace the American lifestyle, particularly its institutions and language. This conscious decision to remain apart was made by many French Canadians who sought to preserve their heritage, by embracing the idea of la survivance.

By the late 1860’s, more and more French Canadians were simultaneously pushed from Canada by the poor economic situation and pulled to New England by the demand for cheap labor. Also at this time, French-only Roman Catholic parishes and associated parochial schools were being started and organizations, such as the Society of St. Jean Baptiste, helped to safeguard the welfare of the French Canadian people. Unfortunately, these developments tended to hurt the reputation of the French Canadians in the eyes of other Americans as it was viewed as further evidence that French Canadians wished to remain apart from the rest of American society.

By 1870, French Canadians, led by a new influx of professional-class immigrants, began to believe that accepting at least some of the aspects of the American lifestyle would be beneficial. By the second or third generation, many French Canadian children could speak both English and French and were better able to function in American society. As French Canadians successfully integrated into America, their effort to safeguard their unique culture within the borders of the larger American society lessened and the ideal of la survivance faded away.

 

Conclusion

The labor vacuum caused by the Civil War and the demands of industry in the post-war period provided an economic opportunity for the French Canadians to better their lives. They abandoned their farms in Quebec for the mills of New England and simultaneously forsook the myth of an agrarian ideal in which the French Canadian habitant had been the core. They endured discrimination, jealousy and mistrust derived from their different language, religious practices and social and cultural mores. They persevered and built strong, if segregated, communities for social and cultural support and to maintain la survivance.

The French Canadians gained tangible economic and, eventually, social benefits when they immigrated to America, and slowly accepted American culture. Their assimilation into the great American melting pot, which helped their reputation in the eyes of their fellow Americans, also led to a gradual and inexorable loss of their unique cultural identity. In the end, la survivance proved to be an admirable, but ultimately impractical, cultural ideal that did not survive in the face of the overwhelming pressure applied by the American people and their traditions and institutions.

Annotated Bibliography

Allen, James P. “Migration Fields of French Canadian Immigrants to Southern Maine.” Geographical Review, Vol.62, No.3 (1972): 366-383.

Heavily theoretical study which utilizes a lot of statistical analysis in an attempt to determine if there is a noticeable trend of members of particular French Canadian communities migrating to the same towns or cities in the United States.

Bélanger, Damien-Claude. “Canada, French Canadians and Franco-Americans in the Civil War Era (1861-1865),” 2001, <http://www2.marianopolis.edu/ quebechistory/frncdns/studies/dcb/default.htm> (12 September 2003).

Probably the latest of only a handful of studies concerning the French Canadians during the Civil War. Convincingly dispenses with the myth of 40,000 French Canadians serving in the war and his arguments are well sourced.

Bélanger, Damien-Claude and Claude Bélanger. “French Canadian Emigration to the United States, 1840-1930,” 2000, <> (18 September 2003).

Comprehensive survey of the French Canadian migration to the United States. Understands the French Canadian mindset and the social and cultural factors that affected their outlook on life.

Brault, Gerard J. “The New England French Culture.” The French Review, Vol.45, No.4 (1972): 831-837.

Article which deals primarily with the societal underpinnings of French Canadian culture. Pays particular attention to the role of the priesthood and its sermonizing against abandoning the homeland. Also delves into the makeup of French Canadian society in general.

Chartier, Armand. The Franco-Americans of New England: A History. trans. Robert J. Lemieux and revised, edited and translated by Claire Quintal. Manchester, NH: ACA Assurance; Worcester, MA: Institut Français of Assumption College, 1999.

Updated history of the Franco-Americans in New England, which concentrates on the struggle for survivance in the 20^th Century. The chapters dealing with the history of French Canadian immigration to the United States provide a good summarization of the events.

Hansen, Marcus Lee and John Bartlett Brebner. The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940.

Survey work that deals with how the Canadian and American people, though generally having an amicable relationship, have often come in conflict more than has been thought. The parts that deal with the French Canadians are particularly fair summarizations, but the authors rely on the inflated statistic of 40,000 French Canadian enlistments to perhaps overstate the relative contribution of French Canadian fighting men during the Civil War.

Keenleyside, Hugh Llewellyn and Gerald S. Brown. Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of Their Historical Relations. Introduction by W.P.M. Kennedy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.

A complete and thorough recounting of the relations between Canada and the United States from Colonial times until the 20^th Century. Provides good insight into the political history of Canada as it tried to deal with a Civil War in the United States while being a member of the British Empire. The discussion on the negative impact felt by Canada when so many Canadians left for the United States is insightful.

Ledoux, Denis. “La Survivance. Giving Voice to a Franco-American Experience,” Portland Monthly, April 2000, <http://www.maine.rr.com/Around_Town/ features/portlandmonthly/Default5.asp> (22 September 2003).

A narrative detailing the experience of a French Canadian author as he realizes the loss of his French Canadian heritage, but maintains hope that the next generation will reclaim it.

Lemay, Philippe . “The French Canadian Textile Worker.” Interview by Louis Pare, American Life Histories: Manuscripts from the Federal Writers’ Project, 1936-1940, No. 1801 (1938-39): 1-40.

An in depth interview with a French Canadian immigrant who worked his entire life in the textile mills. The majority of the interview deals with his life, but he also describes the lives of his family and how they were impacted upon emigrating to the United States just after the Civil War.

Lonn, Ella. Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy. Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 1951.

This work deals with the variety of ethic groups that served in the Union Army and Navy during the Civil War. Scant reference is made to Canadian, much less French Canadian, participation in the war. This is chiefly due to the author’s tendency to focus on those regiments made up entirely of a particular ethnic group, such as the Irish or Germans. No such regiment of French Canadians existed.

Lower, A.R.M. “New France in New England.” The New England Quarterly, Vol.2, No.2 (1929), 278-295.

A summary of the formation of French Canadian communities in New England. Particularly good description of the phases of immigration.

McDonald, William. “The French Canadians in New England.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.12, No.3 (1898): 245-279.

A study of French Canadian immigration after the Civil War. Has a good grasp of French Canadian culture and society, though is given to lapsing into stereotypes. Given the date of the articles publication, the intent seems to have been to simultaneously reassure native Americans that there weren’t as many French Canadians in the United States as had been thought and that eventually, despite their reluctance to do so, the French Canadians would be “properly” assimilated into American culture and that so-called “Native Americans” had nothing to fear from them.

McGaw, Judith A. “’A Good Place to Work.’ Industrial Workers and Occupational Choice: The Case of Berkshire Women.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol.10, No.2 (1979): 227-248.

Details the women’s employment opportunities in the mills. The insight into the degree of involvement of the entire family in making employment decisions was valuable.

McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Ballantine Books, 1988.

As close to a definitive work on the Civil War as can be had. For this study, the discussion about the Union labor shortage was particularly helpful in providing context.

New York Daily Times. 30 June 1853 – 26 March 1856.

The predecessor to the New York Times. Reports from Canada appear fairly regularly, most of which dealt with the Seigniorial Tenure Bill and the question of annexing Canada to the United States.

New York Times. 20 August 1858 – 11 November 1870.

Many articles tried to determine Canadian sympathies during the Civil War and quite a few reports of French Canadian meetings in New York City and New England. Contained a good number of articles warning of the influx of French Canadian immigrants. Also reported on the annexation movement in Canada.

Podea, Iris Saunders. “Quebec to ‘Little Canada’: The Coming of the French Canadians to New England in the Nineteenth Century." The New England Quarterly, Vol.23, No.3 (1950): 365-380.

A particularly well researched article that covers the French Canadian migration to New England from the early 19^th Century until well into the 20^th Century. Does a good job of explaining their reasons for leaving Canada and then of the obstacles that they had to be overcome to be accepted in their new homeland.

Roby, Yves. Les Franco-Américains de la Nouvelle Angleterre, 1776-1930. Sillery, Quebec: Septentrion, 1990.

A French language study of the Franco-Americans in New England. Specifically, his New England French Canadian population figures were used to populate the Tables in this paper.

Rodgers, Daniel T. “Tradition, Modernity, and the American Industrial Worker: Reflections and Critique.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol.7, No.4 (1977): 655-681.

Article that deals primarily with the affect that the various changing characteristics of the typical factory worker had on the ability of the mill owner or employer to operate his mill.

Winks, Robin. Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960.

A thoroughly intense and invaluable treatment of the relationship between Canada and the U.S. during the Civil War. Very in depth re-telling of the political and diplomatic history during this era.

PART 1  -  PART 2  -  PART 3  -  PART  4 

Immigrants and War: French Canadians in the Civil War Era III

NB: This is the 3rd part of a series (Here is Part 1 and Part 2). If you don't feel like reading the others, I guess you could be satisfied reading this post. As far as the entire 4-part series goes, it is a conflation of a traditional research paper with online links interspersed. Time prevents me from a thorough going-over, so any mistakes, misattributions or faulty citation (in short, "sloppiness") should be taken with a grain of salt. While I'm aware of some formatting inconsistencies, I ask that the reader pass over those: I'm more concerned with the content than the presentation. Nonetheless, it would be appreciated if legitimate scholarly errors or oversights were brought to my immediate attention.


PART 1  -  PART 2  -  PART 3  -  PART  4 

Part 3: French Canadians in New England after the Civil War

 

French Canadian Reputation in America

At the end of the Civil War, the old patterns of migration back and forth across the border did not return. Thousands of French Canadians who had worked in the New England textile mills before the war returned to New England and joined those who had stayed throughout the war. In 1865, the great French Canadian migration truly began, but they did not only go to New England. The abundance of farmland in the American Midwest and work in the timber industry in places like Michigan and Wisconsin was attractive to many habitants. Eastern Canadian cities were well connected to the eastern cities of the United States via railroad, which in turn connected to the American Midwest. Despite the romantic allure of life in the west, it still cost less to move to New England and most French Canadians did choose to remain close to home by settling in the “petit Canadas” of New England factory towns. [1]

Their willingness to migrate to these “petit Canadas”, despite the filth and poorly kept housing that characterized these neighborhoods, led to a reputation of being an ignorant and unclean people. “Darkness, foul odors, lack of space and air, shabby surroundings, all these were universal characteristics of tenement life, to which the French Canadians had no exclusive claim, but their quarters were repeatedly singled out as among the worst or most ill-kept in New England.”[2] The reasons for living in these ghettos were many. Economic factors were the primary reason as it was simply cheaper to pack a family into a small row house, which was often owned by their employer. Additionally, they had a natural desire to live near those who they knew and they moved to those neighborhoods in which their relatives and friends lived. Finally, they followed the tendency of most immigrants, especially those from a rural background, to want to maintain their traditional values in a new environment. Settlement in “petit Canadas” allowed them to be close to their work and also allowed them to settle in a neighborhood that closely resembled the parish that they had left. The surroundings may have been alien to them, but the familiar people and sense of community provided a cocoon that insulated them and helped them cope with the monumental differences between American society and that of their heritage.[3]

Their willingness to employ all able members of their families in the mills allowed them to survive on less than the average American family, but also caused them much ill will. A reputation of excessive frugality caused jealousy among other workers, who often referred to the French Canadians as the “Chinese of the East.” Finally, the fact that many had been brought in as strike breakers did not gain them any sympathy from their co-workers. These were but a few of the problems encountered by the French Canadians as they tried to make a living in America, but these were experienced by many immigrant groups. The French Canadian encountered more resistance than many other immigrant groups chiefly because of their apparent unwillingness to accept and be accepted into American culture. [4]

 

La survivance: Benefits and Drawbacks

La survivance was both a noble ideal and a stumbling block to the full acceptance by Americans of French Canadian immigrants. When the French Canadians arrived in the United States, the prospect of them staying or going back to Canada was often an open question for both themselves and Americans. At first, they didn’t seem inclined to make the U.S. a permanent home. They sought jobs in the U.S. because of poor economic conditions in Canada and hoped to earn a few hundred dollars in the mills and return to their farms to continue to aspire to the ideal of la vocation de la terr. Those who did not return to Canada immediately did send money home, which seemed to indicate the transient nature of their stay in America.[5]

Unlike European immigrants, the French Canadians in New England were geographically close to their homeland and the maintenance of family and communal bonds was facilitated through visits, reading newspapers from Canada and by sending their children to be educated in the land of their heritage. This open, dual loyalty puzzled many Americans, especially when contrasted with the attitudes of the majority of other immigrant groups. To many Americans, the French Canadian people appeared willing to reap the rewards of the economic boom while at the same time unwilling to participate in American society as a whole. This dichotomy led to much resentment, and it was the French Canadian attitude towards religion, education, and language that led to the most suspicion.[6]

The Catholic French Canadians took their faith to Puritanical New England and faced many obstacles as they attempted to practice their religion. It is true that there were already Roman Catholic parishes throughout New England, but most of these had been established by the English speaking Irish who had been established firmly in New England prior to the arrival of the French Canadians. The Irish viewed the French Canadians with jealousy and suspicion, an attitude at least partially developed from the fact that the Irish were overwhelmingly pro-union and had seen French Canadian strike breakers brought in by mill owners time after time. Misunderstandings between the two groups were exacerbated by the additional problem of the language barrier. The language problem proved especially difficult because Irish priests often led the mixed parishes of Irish and French Canadians and there were internal clashes between the two groups. A natural desire to establish their own, French speaking parishes led Bishop Goesbriand of Vermont to lobby the Church of New England for the establishment of French parishes with French speaking priests. Though initially opposed, by 1869 his request was granted and soon French Canadians throughout New England began setting up parishes of their own.[7]

Hand in hand with the establishment of the churches was that of the parochial schools, which usually taught in both French and English. This was in contrast to the public schools, which made little or no effort to provide for non-English speaking children. It was primarily for this reason that public schools were rejected by the majority of French Canadians in favor of the parochial schools. Besides serving the spiritual and educational needs of the French Canadian community respectively, the French Roman Catholic Church and parochial school provided for the maintenance of la survivance.

The maintenance of la survivance was also the primary objective of the Societies of St. Jean Baptiste, which began springing up in French Canadian parishes by the mid-1860s. The Society of St. Jean Baptiste was comprised of the leading men of the parish and greatly influenced all aspects of parish life. French was spoken throughout the society and the goals of the society were the aforementioned maintenance of la survivance as well as to serve as advocates for the interests of the French Canadian people in the United States. It is ironic that the desire to give the French Canadian people a voice in their communities, as well as in government and politics, resulted in the slow degradation of la survivance. [8]

The French Canadians initially stayed away from politics or involvement in local government. Neither political party had ever catered to them, chiefly due to the language barrier and probably because of some racial or religious prejudice. As a practical matter, many politicians probably did not want to waste their effort attempting to appeal to a group that primarily consisted of transient workers who made no attempt to speak the language or showed any inclination of making America their permanent home. Eventually, French Canadian leaders, including those in the Society of St. Jean Baptiste, came to realize that self-segregation and their apparent unwillingness to becoming participants in American society was detrimental to their reputation. They determined that naturalization of the French Canadian people was the most effective method they could use to gain acceptance. Initial interest in naturalization was less than overwhelming, but the members of the various chapters of the Society of St. Jean Baptiste persisted. They held numerous National Conventions of French Canadians in the United States to promote naturalization and these meetings also unified them in their efforts to overcome the stereotypes held by other Americans.[9]

These efforts to more fully integrate the French Canadian people into America were hindered by the increasing influx of French Canadians from Canada. While headway was being made to naturalize those already in the U.S., there was a significant amount of time spent indoctrinating and orienting the successive waves of French Canadians coming across the border. The stream of rural habitants arriving in the United States also reaffirmed a negative stereotype. To the jaundiced eye of many Americans, the French Canadians seemed to repeatedly commit the same infractions against accepted American social practices. No discrimination between the recent French Canadian immigrants and those of the second or third generation was made.[10]

 

Increased Migration and Assimilation Begins

By 1869, the realization had set in that the emigration of French Canadians from Canada because of the poor economic conditions was not a temporary phenomenon. A reporter for the New York Times wrote of the fear expressed by many French Canadians that, after having endured an especially hard winter, they would not be able to make enough money on their farms to make it through another similarly difficult winter. They especially were disappointed by the lack of industrial jobs in their homeland, which could have employed them when the demand for farm labor was not present. In May of 1870, the Montreal Witness reported that there were between two and three thousand dwellings vacant in the city of Montreal. This was estimated to represent the loss of from ten to fifteen thousand people. It also reported that it was not unusual to see two hundred French Canadians a day leaving St. Bonaventure Station for the United States.[11]

The post-War increase in the number of rural French Canadian immigrants in the United States did not go unnoticed. Many American newspapers reported complaints concerning the influx and these complaints were supplemented by exaggerated estimates of the number of French Canadians that had arrived in America. In April of 1870, the New York Times reported that there were estimated to be 500,000 French Canadians in the United States. Recent scholarship puts the actual figure at closer to 100,000 in all of New England (refer to Table 2), which had the largest concentration of French Canadians in the United States. Given this last, it is scarcely believable that an additional 400,000 French Canadians lived in the Midwest or West. Another reporter writing for the Times also noted how the French Canadians continued to migrate southward even when they were encouraged by Parliament and were given inducements to remain in Canada.[12]

The dam that the newspapers, politicians, and religious leaders, on both sides of the border, tried to strengthen with warnings, speeches and harangues in an attempt to check the flow of French Canadians leaving Canada for America only weakened and burst. Idealistic abstractions were no match for the reality of economic hardship. The initial trickle of French Canadians who had endured discrimination, bigotry and mistrust in America showed their friends, families and communities that the rewards of working in America were well worth the trouble. Immediately after the Civil War, the trickle became a stream and by 1870 the stream became a river. The push of economic uncertainty north of the border combined with the pull of ever-growing thirst for manpower by the factories and mills south of the border proved irresistible.

For the next thirty years the immigration of French Canadians to the U.S. reached new levels. Included in this wave were a great many of the intellectual and professional classes who contributed greatly to the social and cultural welfare of the French Canadians in New England. By the second or third generation, the Franco-Americans who were the progeny of the original, unskilled habitants were being brought up bilingual and better able to participate in American society. Undoubtedly, the constant pressure from other Americans to conform to the generally accepted precepts of American life also influenced the behavior of the Franco-Americans. In the end, their willingness to accept American society as their own led to the full integration of the French Canadian people into America, though many would regret that la survivance had been sacrificed in the process.[13]

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[1] Mason Wade, “The French Parish and Survivance in Nineteenth Century New England,” Catholic Historical Review, Vol.36 (Jul., 1950), 173, in Winks, 205; and Keenleyside and Brown, 304.

[2] Podea, 375.

[3] Brault, 836.

[4] MacDonald, 267; and Podea, 373.

[5] MacDonald, 267-268.

[6] Podea, 380.

[7] Chartier, 16.

[8] MacDonald, 272-274.

[9] See a variety of articles from the New York Times 1865-1869 for reports detailing the proceedings of these conventions.

[10] Podea, 379.

[11] New York Times, 28 February 1869; 28 March 1869; and 23 May 1870.

[12] New York Times, 6 April 1870 and 10 April 1869.

[13] Chartier, 15; and Podea, 379; and Denis Ledoux, “La Survivance. Giving Voice to a Franco-American Experience,” Portland Monthly, (April 2000), http://www.maine.rr.com/Around_Town/features/ portlandmonthly/Default5.asp> (22 September 2003).

Up Next: Part 4 - Summary, Conclusion and an Annotated Bibliography

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