Google Offers Free Books!

It has been widely publicized amongst the bibliophile world that Google was scanning books and offering those images up for public viewing via the web. Well now, they are offering downloadable copies of public domain works. Just go to Google Book Search, select the "Full View Books" button (and a search term!) and you will have the chance to download to your hearts content!

Pollution (and Global Warming?) as a Historical Tool

Hmm. I see that "Metal Pollution From Medieval Mining Persists" (via Cronaca), and that a "summer heat wave has unearthed a historic past" (via Mirablilis). Then I learned from Brian Ward-Perkins in his Fall of Rome) that archaelogists have used the polution caused by Roman metalsmithing--as found buried in the Arctic ice cap--to gauge the extent of industry prior to Rome's fall. All in all, I'd say some good can come from global warming and pollution!

Trying Too Hard to Learn from History

Josh Manchester writes:

Our attempts to compare every conflict to World War II or Vietnam hinder our ability to fight different kinds of wars, including the current one.

In the pantheon of American warfare, no conflict garners as much popular admiration as the Second World War, which holds the title of ideal war...Whereas World War II is the gold standard for US warfare in most Americans' reckoning, the specter of Vietnam forever haunts our every move in any conflict that does not appear to resemble World War II...

The result of these two national experiences is that warfare exists along a one-dimensional axis for most Americans. World War II exists as the positive terminal of this circuit, and Vietnam as the negative; the tendency then is to reinforce the one, while eschewing the other.

As he also writes, "[t]he truth is something more complicated."  Indeed, much historical work has been done to strip away the "preferred remembrances" of WWII and there have also been attempts to play out various "what if?" scenarios with regards to Vietnam. Such revision and counterfactual assessment are the bread and butter of History.  However, too often, we all (myself included) fall into the trap of trying too hard to learn from the past.  No contemporary situation is ever exactly like something that's happened before.  As Manchester explains, searching for similarities between "then" and "now" can lead to simplistic and faulty conclusions:

Many observers across the political spectrum today seek to account for our failures or defeats in the War on Terror by partaking in complicated analogies to determine whether we are in a particular phase of World War Two, say, 1939 for example, and have thus really not begun to fight at all, or whether we are in the midst of the folly that characterized the Johnson White House, say in 1967, and thus are destined to lose.

But we would be better served as a nation to take a cold, hard, sober look at our position in 2006 and note that while similarities can always be found throughout history, each incident is strikingly different and the future is never foretold. We would be better served as a nation to note that we are engaged in a counterinsurgency and nation-building campaign in Iraq that resembles Vietnam in some superficial ways, but does not make failure a foregone conclusion; and moreover, that while counterinsurgency tactics and strategies might currently apply in Iraq, that does not mean they will always apply everywhere...

We can take our cues from the mistakes and successes of our history, but we shouldn't deceive ourselves by taking history as a preordained script.  "It happened before, it'll happen again" is a pithily accurate statement in a generic sort of way,  but the particulars and contingencies of any given historical moment vary from time and place to time and place. History does provides us with cautionary tales that can (hopefully) make us more deliberate in considering our future actions. But it is only one portion of all that needs to be considered.  What we know (or think we know) about a current situation is still the largest determinant of future action. 

Albion's Seedlings on The Fall of Rome

James McCormick has a review of Brian Ward-Perkins The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization. I made a few comments, but still intend on doing my own review of both it and Peter Heather's latest book--once I get Heather's book! (A first: an Amazon re-seller is woefully late in shipping, didn't provide me a tracking number and hasn't responded to my request for one...UPDATE: He responded to email #2, and said he shipped it 2-3 weeks ago, didn't have a tracking number. Still waiting.)

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity - We Need 'Em All

I'd recommend reading Danny Kruger's Prospect piece about the struggle between the two main political philosophies in Great Britain (and in America, for that matter). To pithily summarize:

In our politics, then, the thesis of the left—the pure governing idea that is realised through the dialectic—is equality. The thesis of the right is liberty. And for both, the antithesis—the messy reality into which they are accommodated—is fraternity.

Also:

Liberty and fraternity may be in tension, but they are not incompatible. The free market depends on the values of trust and reciprocity that are generated by the traditional family and nation, and these in turn are best preserved in a climate of freedom.

While the article has much that is specific to Great Britain, there are some general observations well worth digesting for all.

OUPblog: The Fall of Rome - an author dialogue

I'm back from 2 weeks of vacation. The one scholarly thing I did do whilst away was read this author dialogue (via Cliopatria) between Bryan Ward-Perkins (The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization) and Peter Heather (The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians). I actually already have Heather's book on order and I was significantly intrigued by the blog post to go out and get Ward-Perkins book from the library. The latter work was a pretty easy read (it's relatively thin). I took some notes whilst reading it and once I get Heather's work, I think I'll do a compare and contrast.

Vacation Time

Well, time to recharge the batteries. I may peek in over the next two weeks, but during the first week I'll be tooling around here:



and maybe here



and then going around here



for the weekend (though staying here).

I don't suspect I'll get (or want) much computer time.

After that, it's back to the home state for another week of R-and-R, and the chances are a bit higher that I'll get online.

But no promises.

Blogs are just like pamphlets version 8.0 (or so)

Michael Barone points to Nicholas Lemann who has a recent article that likens Blogs to the pamphlets of yore. I wonder if Lemann read AJStrata and Howard Kurtz back in April? Or if they read Frederick Turner in 2004? Or if he read John Palfrey in 2003? Or if he read Dan Bricklin in 2001, who heard the idea from Chris Daly who in turn took the idea from Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, which was written in the 1960's. (BTW, I know that a blogging historian wrote a good article on this topic, but I can't remember who!!! Anyone?) What's my point? Either the blogs=pamphlets meme will never take hold and continue to be some sort of locust-like, ephemeral notion, or it finally will take permanent hold because the likes of Barone, Kurtz and The New Yorker have started to promulgate it. Incidentally, I think it's a good analogy (and have for a couple years ;).

Revisionism: It's "good" if I Agree with it or "I'll Have my Historical Cake and eat it too!"

William Nolte (via Arts and Letters Daily) begins his review of Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev's The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—the Stalin Era with:

[Alger] Hiss and [Whittaker] Chambers worked together as Soviet source and courier from late 1934 until the latter’s defection from the underground in 1938.

Two generations of controversy can be compressed into that spare, declarative statement from The Haunted Wood, by Allen Weinstein and former KGB officer Alexander Vassiliev. Alger Hiss was a Soviet spy. Not “according to Whittaker Chambers.” Not “an alleged Soviet agent.” After more than five decades, Hiss's treason can now be stated simply as fact.

But truth is rarely so simple, especially in a case that has stirred so many emotions and is so intertwined with issues larger than the veracity of the two men, Hiss and Chambers, who stood at its center. In December 1998, National Public Radio reported that “recent revelations have convinced some scholars that Hiss was guilty.” [Italics added.] For 30 years, defenders of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg protested their innocence; now they protest their sentencing, with bare mention, in many instances, of the ground that has shifted under the issue.

Thus--despite the stereotype that all academic historians are (boo, hiss) revisionists--do we have an example of the resistance of some academic historians to revision. (Warning: generalizations imminent).

So often we hear (mostly from the political right) about the revisionism done by historians that has served to undermine the "true" history of our country. This, in turn, has led to a widespread assumption that all revisionism is bad. But then we have this. I would bet that this example of revisionism would be considered "good" by most on the right.

Meanwhile many of the historians on the left--who have been at the forefront of revisionism--have been reluctant to accept this particular instance. And here we have the commonality between the two: revisionism is good or bad depending on one's ideological predisposition. Of course, the necessary precursor to that is that the history that should (or shouldn't) be revised is good or bad depending on one's ideological predisposition.

Goffart's Barbarian Tides

Walter Goffart, whose Barbarians and Romans was an important source for me during my MA thesis work, has written a new book (Barbarian Tides: The Migration Age and the Later Roman Empire) that will eventually make it to my bookshelf. I suspect that when taken together, both Tides and Heather's new Fall of the Roman Empire will provide anyone interested in the early Middle Ages with an up-to-date survey of current scholarship. For myself, I am definitely of the "Goffart School" (with a nod also to Patrick Geary, btw). Here's the publishers blurb:

The Migration Age is still envisioned as an onrush of expansionary "Germans" pouring unwanted into the Roman Empire and subjecting it to pressures so great that its western parts collapsed under the weight. Further developing the themes set forth in his classic Barbarians and Romans, Walter Goffart dismantles this grand narrative, shaking the barbarians of late antiquity out of this "Germanic" setting and reimagining the role of foreigners in the Later Roman Empire.

The Empire was not swamped by a migratory Germanic flood for the simple reason that there was no single ancient Germanic civilization to be transplanted onto ex-Roman soil. Since the sixteenth century, the belief that purposeful Germans existed in parallel with the Romans has been a fixed point in European history. Goffart uncovers the origins of this historical untruth and argues that any projection of a modern Germany out of an ancient one is illusory. Rather, the multiplicity of northern peoples once living on the edges of the Empire participated with the Romans in the larger stirrings of late antiquity. Most relevant among these was the long militarization that gripped late Roman society concurrently with its Christianization.

If the fragmented foreign peoples with which the Empire dealt gave Rome an advantage in maintaining its ascendancy, the readiness to admit military talents of any social origin to positions of leadership opened the door of imperial service to immigrants from beyond its frontiers. Many barbarians were settled in the provinces without dislodging the Roman residents or destabilizing landownership; some were even incorporated into the ruling families of the Empire. The outcome of this process, Goffart argues, was a society headed by elites of soldiers and Christian clergy—one we have come to call medieval.

As I've argued before, the repercussions of the flawed historiographical assumptions made by earlier historians of the Early Middle Ages are still felt today. The different historiographical approach offered by Goffart (and Geary) shows the way for other historians to engage in some much needed revision of the period.

(via Eileen Joy at In The Middle)

Old Providence

Art In Ruins is devoted to documenting old architecture (and more) in and around Providence, Rhode Island. There are pictures of buildings that no longer exist and more recent pictures of old buildings in various states of disrepair, refurbishment or preservation, too. I particularly liked the historical section (surprise!), especially this rare photo of Providence c.1903.

Heather's The Fall of the Roman Empire

James McCormick has read and reviewed Peter Heather's The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History.

Heather offers a newly refreshed summary of the events, balancing the cultural relativism and cynicism of post-WW2 historians with the practical insights of industrious archaeologists. Romans come off a lot less decadent and inept than Edward Gibbon would have them. Christianity gets less of a "ding."

The great benefit of this book, to my mind, is that it is geared to the educated but non-academic reader, and it appears to cover most of the basic facts and puzzles of the time period. The arguments are outlined, and the author maintains his own point of view without trampling those of others. The entire sweep of the century between the first Goths crossing the Danube (376) and the final imperial reign in the western empire is laid out methodically and readers can reach their own conclusions if they wish.

Where did bad luck or Roman political stagnation or barbarian political evolution play a role? What circumstances distinguished the western empire from the eastern? And how did the lack of military and demographic advantage work against the Romans in tackling first the Persians, then the Goths, and finally the Huns? The book gives readers all the information they need to ponder these questions for themselves.

I intend to order it soon!

Historical Consumerism

Original post 7/12/2006

Another Damn Medievalist pointed me to the Observers posting of this speech by UK Historian Stephen Fry about why history matters. (Fry is promoting the "History Matters - Pass it on" campaign that is currently underway in the UK). Fry's speech is a very accessible introduction to the sort of high-brow, jargon laden debate in which historians engage all of the time. That is why it's so important. Hopefully, the discussion that Fry has instigated amongst historians will be just as accessible. (In answer to Ralph's question: Yes, I'd say this is worthy of a Cliopatria Symposia) .

Jeffrey Cohen at In The Middle solicited his readers to explain why history mattered to them, which led to a discussion of the different motivations for why Americans and British study the Middle Ages. Cohen admited that Tolkien was a motivation for his entrance into the field of Medieval History. The same goes for me, but my interest in history preceded my exposure to Tolkien and other Fantasy authors. (Aside: I used to read a lot of "high Fantasy", but now I'm too busy reading "real" stuff to spend time on reading fiction...I should change that. Historians can learn a lot about the craft of writing from works of fiction). For that matter, I also liked comic books (what 11 year old boy didn't?) and fantasy movies. Looking back, Conan ("To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women!") probably had an influence on my interest in those Early M.A. barbarians. However, I'd have to say that the "tipping point" for my entry into formal historical study was genealogy.

To begin with, I learned that my last name wasn't always the last name of my patrilineal line. In fact, "Comtois" is a "dit" name. "Dit" is basically the French equivalent of the English "aka" (also known as). The "real" last name of my paternal ancestors was Gilbert dit Comtois: "Gilbert known as Comtois" or "Gilbert the Comtois". As for the name "Comtois," it means "of, or being from Franche Comte," a historic region in Eastern France. "Franche Comte" means "Free County" and it was historically known as the "Free County of Burgundy". Some time during the late 19th century, while my ancestors and many other French-Canadians were making the seasonal transit between Quebec and the New England textile mills, the "Gilbert" got dropped by those in my direct line. (Some of my "way back" uncles kept the "Gilbert" instead, so I could have just as easily have been Marc Gilbert as Marc Comtois).

As I was tracing my patrilineal line back through New England, Quebec and finally to Besancon in Franche Comte (now Besancon is part of the Department of Doubs), I also studied the history of those places. As I went further and further back, I finally bumped into the Burgundians of the Early M.A. and the Sequani of Antiquity. Before I knew it, I was taking a Grad level Medieval History class at Providence College and considering going for an MA in my "free" time. The rest is history (I couldn't resist!).

I believe that my story can serve as an example of how personalized interest can lead to deeper historical learning. My initial interest in history was antiquarian--I just liked old stuff (still do). Then I became interested in not only my particular family history, but also the larger historical forces that shaped the decisions they made and, subsequently, their lives. In this way, I gained a deeper understanding of both my personal past and the past of my country.

Well written and accessible history can make people realize that they have a stake in the past. The success of popular histories, particularly biographies, in recent years can attest to that. But even these histories appeal only to those who already have a curiosity about history in and of itself. What about the rest of the people who don't neither have an intrinsic interest in history nor think that history is important to them?

Part of this attitude may be because the "average Joe" doesn't have anyone "famous" in his past. This may be an unfortunate side effect of history as biography. Of course there are many historical biographies about average folks living during compelling times, but these biographies often serve as an introduction to a previously unknown person. Without a historical radar, so to speak, how can someone not looking for such a history know it exists?

This brings me back to genealogy and how it led me to history. As I said, I was already a consumer of history, so I'm not a perfect example of a disinterested person suddenly having his historical fire sparked by personal interest. But there is something about the "appeal to the personal" that historians may be able use as a toehold in the public conscience. Perhaps in our "me" culture, the easiest path to a more widespread acknowledgment of the importance of history is to explain to people that everyone has their own history. It's there, you just have to take ownership of it.

Genealogy is just one avenue that could be used to pique those personal interests. Pop culture is another with historical movies and tv shows. ("So you like this movie, guess what is based on?"). These are not new ideas--the History Channel(s) and others devote hours of programming to just this sort of thing. But taken together, they can be viewed as parts of a whole: an approach to history that I'd call historical consumerism. Find out what people are interested in, and then deliver a little history with it. To quote Mary Poppins, "A spoonful of sugar..."

Who's Who? Me!

Well, I must confess that this is a little too close to self-congratulatory puffery for me, but I suppose I should mention that I've been "selected" to be in Marquis' "Who's Who in America" 2007 Edition. How did it happen? Well, I'm not sure how they got my name, though I suspect it was MA related, and after reading the mailer, I thought, "What the heck?" So I filled out the info for my bio and sent it back to Marquis.

They responded with their first pass on how my bio would look in their register, asked for a few corrections and included an order form--you know, a "special offer"--for me to fill out. Seeing that one copy cost well above what I could afford (or at least legitimize!), I took a pass, but followed up with the corrections. Now my curiosity was piqued to see if it was a money making scheme or if I had "it" to be a "who." Well, two days ago, I got a letter that said I was in. . . along with another order form. We'll see if my acceptance gets lost or not when it is discovered that I haven't committed to purchasing the book. (I don't mean to cast aspersions on Marquis, but, like many, I've seen this sort of "special offer" rescinded before).

Until then, my ego and I will take comfort in being associated with the likes of Presidents, Astronauts, and Johnny Depp. Amongst these giants strides a middle-class Dad from Rhode Island who happens to blog, coach soccer and loves the Sox and Pats.

Heh.

About those "Hidden" French in the Anglosphere...

I guess my off-the-cuff ruminating about the differences between Canada and the U.S. and Australia wasn't so far off. James Bennett mentions the effect that the Quebecois had on the Anglo-Canadians in this much broader post about the differences within the Anglosphere:

Take any broad and internally diverse cultural-linguistic area, and divide it into two or more state regimes. Prior to this division, the different cultural streams in the different regions will strike a balance of interests and attitudes. Alter the proportions of those regional streams, even if all the ingredients are the same, and the political outcome will be different.

One of the important facts about post-World War Two West Germany was that it was substantially more Catholic than Germany as a whole. Thus the Catholic Christian Democrat tradition and ideology was able to serve as a dominant political philosophy for the new republic, under the leadership of Christian Democrats like Conrad Audenauer, who would have not so easy a timee in a united Germany.

In Anglosphere terms, the same effect meant that the quite similar political temperaments of New England and anglophone Canada had substantially different impacts on their respective nations: the New Englanders have always been one part of a mix that also included Southern lowlanders, Scots-Irish, and midland Pennsylvanians and New Yorkers, while the anglo-Canadians have always needed to seek compromise with Quebecois.

From this start, we then add two and a quarter centuries of different state actions, and the different shared experiences of American and Canadians, respectively. (Or the quite different experiences of the various regional cultures in the British Isles and of their descendants in other parts of the Anglosphere.) These add up over time.

There's a whole lot more to Bennett's piece that's worth reading. Particularly interesting are his ruminations about the national narratives of Britain, America, Canada and Australia and how these nations couldn't have taken on their current characteristics-- culturally and geographically--had it not been for a few "Lockean bargains" made between "Burkean communities".

The "Hidden" French in the Anglosphere

Charles Krauthammer "loves" Australia and explains:

Of course I'm prejudiced, having married an Australian, but how not to like a country, in this age of sniveling grubs worldwide, whose treasurer suggests to any person who ``wants to live under sharia law'' to try Saudi Arabia and Iran, ``but not Australia.'' He was elaborating on an earlier suggestion that ``people who ... don't want to live by Australian values and understand them, well then they can basically clear off.'' Contrast this with Canada, historically and culturally Australia's commonwealth twin, where last year Ontario actually gave serious consideration to allowing its Muslims to live under sharia law.

The United States, Canada and Australia are all former British colonies, but while the U.S. and Australia seem to be very much alike, Canada seems more, well, "European." Thus, the U.S. and Aussies seem to have more in common these days. Krauthammer tries to explain why.

Why? Because Australia's geographic and historical isolation has bred a wisdom about the structure of peace -- a wisdom that eludes most other countries. Australia has no illusions about the ``international community'' and its feckless institutions. An island of tranquility in a roiling region, Australia understands that peace and prosperity do not come with the air we breathe, but are maintained by power -- once the power of the British Empire, now the power of the United States.

Australia joined the faraway wars of early-20th-century Europe not out of imperial nostalgia, but out of a deep understanding that its fate and the fate of liberty were intimately bound with that of the British Empire as principal underwriter of the international system. Today the underwriter is America, and Australia understands that an American retreat or defeat -- a chastening consummation devoutly, if secretly, wished by many a Western ally -- would be catastrophic for Australia and for the world.

I would venture to guess (and I'm really just thinking out loud) that the large, Quebecois--and thus not "Anglo-Saxon"--population has influenced Canada in a different direction. Of course, the existence of the Quebecois reminds us that Canada wasn't always a British colony: it was French first. Thus, Canada has been conquered and the conquerors had to deal with a large European population in their new territory. To a large degree, they did this by leaving them alone. Thus, a distinct culture arose in the middle of a "British" colony. Not only were America and Australia never conquered, there really was no such distinct and large group in either the U.S. or Australia. Being conquered and cobbling together a nation composed of two very distinct groups has probably contributed to the differing attitudes of many Canadians. (All that being said, forgive the sweeping generalizations. Like I said, just thinking out loud).

Some Odds and Ends

Cleaning my "drafts" folder of various Odds and Ends before the long Holiday.

First, thanks to Exploratoria for pointing to Shipwreck Central a few days ago. Neat stuff if you're interested in Maritime History and Archaeology.

Second, I ran across these very interesting photographs of North Korea taken by a Russian. (I can't remember where I got the tip, sorry).

Third, I just thought that this observation made by Alan Wolfe in his review of William Bennett's new book was interesting:

Precisely because he is so proud of his country and wants to celebrate its greatness, Bennett calls attention to all those movements toward liberty and equality that enabled the United States to expand its ideals and strengthen its citizens. The fact that so prominent a conservative as Bennett accepts nearly all the major reforms of the 19th century suggests just how much the current American consensus remains a liberal consensus.

I think that Bennett's apparent preference of Jefferson contra Adams and Washington with regard to their respective policy regarding the Barbary Pirates could be interpreted as favoring the more liberal (or libertarian) versus the more conservative.

Fourth, Michael Barone has a job for future historians:

Historians may regard it as a curious thing that the left and the press have been so determined to fit current events into templates based on events that occurred 30 to 40 years ago. The people who effectively framed the issues raised by Vietnam and Watergate did something like the opposite; they insisted that Vietnam was not a reprise of World War II or Korea and that Watergate was something different from the operations J. Edgar Hoover conducted for Franklin Roosevelt or John Kennedy. Journalists in the 1940s, '50s and early '60s tended to believe they had a duty to buttress Americans' faith in their leaders and their government. Journalists since Vietnam and Watergate have tended to believe that they have a duty to undermine such faith, especially when the wrong party is in office.

Back in March, Josiah Ober wondered if democracy was effective. A couple days ago, Jerry Bowyer sketched out the difference between those who do or don't believe in the portability of liberty. These pieces strike me as worthy of comparison. Maybe after the 4th....

Finally, Robert J. Lewis doesn't subscribe to a cyclic view of history and explains why.

Brookhiser in Rhode Island

Historian and National Review contributor Rick Brookhiser will be around these parts to promote his What Would the Founders Do? this Thursday. On NRO, after providing the locations at which he'll be in Rhode Islad, Brookhiser makes this comment about why the smallest state is getting 2 stops:

June 29—Redwood Library & Athenaeum, 50 Bellevue Ave., Newport, Rhode Island. 11 AM-noon.

June 29—Providence Athenaeum, 251 Benefit St. 7-8 PM.

As usual, there will be a talk, a Q&A and a book signing at each place. I can only assume Rhode Island was given two events because, as the last state to sign the Constitution, it needs a good lesson.

That may be, but as any Rhode Island historian (or resident, for that matter) knows, the official name of Rhode Island is really the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. As such, given the fact that most Rhode Islanders pack an overnight bag for any trip over 20 minutes from home, the fact that Brookhiser will be visiting both Rhode Island (Newport) and Providence Plantations (Providence) is really not that big of a surprise. How else could he possibly expect to reach all of the resident's of the state?

Qualifying Bennett's Jefferson: How Jefferson Was Able to Wage War on the Pirates

In "Jefferson's Crisis," an excerpt from Bill Bennett's America: The Last Best Hope, Bennett writes:

Thomas Jefferson faced a lingering foreign crisis early in his administration. For more than twenty years, he had been urging military action against Arab corsairs on the Barbary coast. These were fast, cheap warships that preyed upon merchant shipping along the northern shore of Africa. Various Arab rulers there would regularly declare war against European countries and then begin seizing their ships and men. The captured crews would be held for ransom or sold in the market as slaves. “Christians are cheap today!” was the auctioneer’s cry.

This practice had been going on for centuries.As many as a million and a quarter Europeans had been enslaved by Muslims operating out of North Africa. When he served as America’s minister to France in the mid-1780s, Jefferson had once confronted an Arab diplomat, demanding to know by what right his country attacked Americans in the Mediterranean:

The Ambassador answered us that it was founded on the Laws of the Prophet, that it was written in their Koran, that all nations who should not have answered their authority were sinners, that it was their right and duty to make war upon them wherever they could be found, and to make slaves of all they could take as prisoners.

Confronted by such obstinacy, Jefferson appealed to John Adams, who was then America’s minister to England. But Adams was unwilling to fight. Jefferson resolved from those early days to fight the Muslim hostage-takers. “We ought to begin a naval power, if we mean to carry on our own commerce. Can we begin it on a more honourable occasions or with a weaker foe?” he wrote to James Madison in 1784. The kidnapping and ransoming of American merchantmen continued for nearly twenty years.

The Washington and Adams administrations had gone along with the European practice of paying off the Barbary rulers. It was a protection racket, pure and simple. Adams believed paying tribute was cheaper than war. “We ought not to fight them at all unless we determine to fight them forever,” he said. Paying off the Barbary rulers was not cheap. When Jefferson came into office, the United States had already paid out nearly $2 million. This was nearly one fifth of the federal government’s yearly income!

The Bashaw of Tripoli declared war on the United States in 1801. Jefferson was determined to fight rather than pay tribute. Jefferson sent Commodore Edward Preble in command of the USS Constitution to strengthen America’s naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea.

Bennett then recounts some of the exploits of Edward Preble and Stephen Decatur and then concludes:

By 1805, the pirates had had enough. Jefferson’s willingness to use force had triumphed in America’s first war on terror in the Middle East.

Well, to quote Paul Harvey, here's "The rest of the story." Or should I say the beginning of the story.

In his effort to praise the apparent foresight of Jefferson, Bennett does a disservice to both George Washington and John Adams. For while it was true that Jefferson did express a desire to directly confront the Barbary threat, the key question is: with what?

The answer was, of course, the navy. And while Jefferson did want to build up the navy in 1786, the developing political situation—in which he emerged as the leader of the decidedly anti-naval Democrat Republicans—definitely affected his public support of a strong navy and thus prevented him from throwing his weight behind a large naval buildup. In fact, he and his party attempted to thwart the Federalist naval program at every turn. They viewed the navy as both inherently expansionist and as a source for government patronage and corruption. They also feared that a strong navy would be used against the French, whom they favored against the British--whom the Federalists favored--in the international arena.

Despite this, some few ships were approved under Washington--and fewer still built under Adams. Despite the reduced naval program, the Federalists still succeeded in building a small and effective force that was used in the undeclared naval war against France (the so-called Quasi War) from 1798-1800.

In fact, thanks to the experience gained during these actions, then Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert was able to implement various rules and regulations and was able to evaluate both these as well as the performance of naval officers. Thus, the trial by fire of the Quasi-War proved to be a valuable learning tool for the nascent U.S. Navy.

With lessons learned, a much more effective force was prepared to be called upon when and where needed, as in 1805 when President Jefferson turned to them to deal with the Barbary Pirates. Therefore, while Jefferson deserves credit for finally confronting the Barbary Pirates, it must be remembered that he was able to do so only because of the efforts of his two predecessors, and despite the political policies favored by he and his party.

21st Century Yellow Journalism

Jonah Goldberg points out that the new electronic media is actually enabling a return to an earlier journalistic norm than that we've experienced over the past 50 or so years.

Reporters believed in their duty to be objective even if they didn’t always understand that their biases were quite obvious to those, on the left and right, residing outside the elite liberal consensus. Indeed, it’s worth noting that the standard of objectivity itself was partly a product of technological change and partly a rebellion against 19th-century norms...what fascinates me is how the Internet is allowing the nation to return to its historical relationship with the media, not how it’s changing everything.

In the 19th century, newspapers played a different role from the one we think they’re “supposed” to play. Newspapers contributed a sense of community to the boisterous new cities and towns popping up across the country...American newspapers were never as unapologetically and uniformly partisan as European ones were (and still are), but they were still mostly creatures of specific political biases. There were Republican and Democratic newspapers, populist and communist newspapers, union and anti-union newspapers. These publications served as vehicles for partisan education and crusading personalities, in much the same way leading blogs do today.